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1

Preface

Struck with the belief in justice and full of naivete, I began my undergraduate studies as a
Human Rights major, intending to follow the path towards a law degree. Then the questioning
began—not just about the atrocities of human rights violations that happen around the world,
everywhere, all the time—but also about the concept of “human rights” itself. I realized I truly had
no idea what “human rights” actually meant. It became increasingly harder to imagine fighting for
“human rights” without first defining “rights” or the “human being.” Although I was still
concerned with the injustices that manifest in the world, I questioned the language surrounding
these injustices, I wanted to define the terms. Once I shifted my focus to trying to make sense of
the “human being,” an even larger question opened itself up: “What is Being?” The question
haunted me, like it probably haunts most undergraduate students undergoing the existential rite of
passage. Nonetheless it was there, staring me in the face. And as if the gods, or demons, heard my
questioning, Martin Heidegger was thrusted into my life.
I took a course on Heidegger not entirely certain of what I was getting myself into. But as
the class progressed something changed in me. I was thinking in a way I had never thought before
and it felt incredibly terrifying and thrilling. I was scared of where Heidegger’s writing would take
me. Sometimes it led me into very dark places. But I was exhilarated by this discomfort, a feeling
that I was standing on the edge of a cliff looking down. Heidegger’s writing created a space for
me to rethink what “Being” is and what the parameters of the “human being” are. He put into
words the questions that I felt in my bones. He addressed the question of alienation in a way that
was meaningful for me because his emphasis was always explicitly on language; the problem of
language was how I wound up here in the first place.
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The rest of my undergraduate experience became consumed with these questions: of Being,
the human being, belonging, language, alienation, and multiplicity within the self. For me these
questions of alienation were selfishly rooted in my own sense of multiple selfhood, as my personal
background is very much one of being in-between. Identity politics aren’t my favorite, but where
you are situated in the world does indeed have material effect. As a mixed-race person originating
from ancestors who were both colonizers and colonized, as someone who only fluently speaks
English despite it not being my ancestors’ native tongue, I have always been cognizant of my
liminality and groundlessness. I have never really felt I belong to anyone or anywhere; but the
place where I always felt the most at home is in writing and reading poetry— perhaps because
poetry itself is a kind of in-between.
Poetry allows for the individual to reflect on material suffering and injustice, it heals the
wounds caused by violence against the self. You can grieve with poetry, you can mourn in poetry,
poetry is prayer insofar as it keeps open the possibility of grace. Poetry returns agency to the
individual, particularly the marginalized individual, by allowing the individual self to reclaim their
own identity and sense of belonging despite all of the worldly efforts made against this
reclamation. Poetic language is insurrectionary and empowering, it comes out of the world of
experience but imagines and creates new worlds we may one day belong to; it is world-making.
Initially I intended for this project to place Heidegger into conversation with Gloria
Anzaldúa, a brilliant queer Mestiza writer whose poetry and thinking speaks to these particular
questions of alienation and in-betweenness. But as I began writing I realized I was not ready to
take on such a massive challenge. I was struggling enough to write about Heidegger; how was I to
take on Anzaldúa too? My heart wanted to write about Anzaldúa; I was naturally drawn to a woman
who looked like me, who I deeply admired, and whose words I ate up. But I knew I had to write
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about Heidegger in order to address the philosophical question I began with, knowing Anzaldúa’s
words and spirit would carry me along the project.
The process of writing about Heidegger has not only been intellectually challenging but
ethically complicated. There were many moments I felt like a sellout— “I should be writing about
anti-colonial, intersectional feminist theory,” I would think to myself. Often, I felt embarrassed to
tell people I was writing about Heidegger because of his Nazi association. It is no secret that
Heidegger is a problematic figure, he joined the Nazi party in 1933. The more I read his philosophy
the less his decision to join the party made sense to me. Of course, Nazism never makes sense in
my mind, but so much of his writing stands so flagrantly opposed to Nazism. I do not wish to play
down his engagement with Nazism, nor cast it aside, since this project is not about Heidegger as a
Nazi. Although I don’t believe you can ever entirely divorce the writing from the writer’s personal
beliefs, this essay is not about Heidegger as a figure. In this essay I am concerned with alienation,
meaning, and poetry, and I provide a reading of Heidegger’s works to address these concerns. As
I previously stated, his writing was the first to radically shift the way I think about these things.
Thus, my thesis was born out of this introduction, and lives just as naïvely as I began.
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She remained faceless and voiceless, but a light shone through
her veil of silence. And though she was unable to spread her
limbs and though for her right now the sun has sunk under the
earth and there is no moon, she continues to tend the flame. The
spirit of fire spurs her to fight for her own skin and a piece of
ground to stand on, a ground from which to view the world— a
perspective, a homeground…
— Gloria Anzaldúa
Borderlands/La Frontera:
The New Mestiza

The map must be of sand and can’t be read by ordinary light. It
must carry fire to the next tribal town, for renewal of spirit.
In the legend are instructions on the language of the land, how it
was we forgot to acknowledge the gift, as if we were not in it or of
it.
Take note of the proliferation of supermarkets and malls, the
altars of money. They best describe the detour from grace.
Keep track of the errors of our forgetfulness; the fog steals our
children while we sleep.
—Joy Harjo
“A Map to the Next World”
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Introduction
This project maps the thinking of Martin Heidegger on the question of being-in-the-world. It asks
what it means to exist as a human being, in a world of alienation and meaninglessness. It peers
into how meaning and language have decayed, and alienation has come to hold sway. It makes a
claim on the true essence of the human being, and how the human being can once again exist
unalienated from their Being, in a thoughtful world full of meaning and revelatory language. And
it says that this world of restored meaning and careful thinking only opens itself up to us, the
human being, in poetry. Truly there is no beginning nor end; rather this map illustrates a series of
points along the various paths of human existence that twist, turn, intersect, and diverge ways. If
followed, some of the paths on this map lead to dense cities of alienation and barren deserts of
meaninglessness. But other paths take us to the edge of the sea, where the water meets the shore
and the beam of sunlight reflecting off of the expansive ocean and glimmering back into our eyes
tells us what it means to be as a human; to our mother’s touch or our father’s smile, where we feel
still and whole in the fullness of gaiety and care; to our favorite patch of trees, where the soil
always smells rich of springtime even in the dead of winter; or to our bathtub, where we close our
eyes and water fills our ears, all noise drowned out but in such tranquil silence we hear so clearly.
These are the moments I feel the most present inside of this world, yet entirely outside of it—
perhaps, that is what it feels like to be cognizant of your own Being. All of these paths, in their
divergence, disparateness, and entanglement, are meaningful insofar as they belong to Being. The
path that leads us into alienation is just as important as the one that leads us into reconciliation
because they all speak to the wide array of being-in-the-world.
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By reading between and across a variety of Martin Heidegger's texts and piecing them
together, this project illustrates the danger of a meaninglessness world and what it could look like
to re-imagine meaning. My thesis is that Heidegger’s thinking sheds light on the profound
alienation in the modern world that is deeply rooted in the reification of language and deterioration
of its meaning, the rise of technique, and the will to power. In the face of such losses, we attempt
to acquire control and reassert ourselves, but we mistakenly do so by treating everything, including
other human beings, as mere means to accomplish our human ends. Such willing only drives us
further away from our belonging to Being, from our essence, and from meaning— furthering our
existence into a meaninglessness state of alienation. But Heidegger’s philosophy does not conceive
of this perilous, alienated destiny of the modern age as a doomed and unchangeable fate. He
introduces a more essential and primordial way of being-in-the-world, and this way lies in poetry.
Because the thesis of this essay is deeply rooted in the thinking of Heidegger, and the essay
itself provides a deep analysis of some of his texts, it is largely articulated in his language. That I
adopt Heidegger’s language is not to say that I don’t provide my own interpretation; the ways in
which I piece together a map of various works and read a thesis statement out of this interplay,
opens up the space for my own reading of Heidegger’s thinking.
The structure of this essay is organized into three sections and each section focuses on a
particular stage of being-in-the-world: the first two illustrate forms of alienation, and the final
introduces an alternative way of thinking that reconciles with Being and our belonging in this
world. Crucial to the entire argument is the idea that the human being essentially belongs to Being.
In such belonging, the human being’s job is to care for and shepherd Being, by thinking toward
Being in language. Being always unconceals itself in the world, but if Being is not thought toward
or cared for properly by the human being, it unconceals itself in perilous ways. The consequence
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of these perilous ways of unconcealing is a severed relationship between the human being and
Being; because the human being belongs to Being, this severing leads to a loss of belonging, i.e.,
alienation. These perilous ways of the human being’s relationship to Being, happen when the
human being abandons their essential role as the shepherd of being and tries to act as master. As
earlier noted, these paths often intersect, run parallel, and part ways. Being can unconceal itself
simultaneously in different ways and multiple ways; this is because Being operates distinct from
limited human scales of space and time. Being is both everywhere and nowhere. Out of its own
nonlinear dimensionality, Being does not have a singular destiny of unconcealing in this world.
This holds open the possibility of a save from its perilous unconcealing.
Despite the nonlinearity of Being’s unconcealment in the world, and thus Being’s
relationship with the human being, I choose to map the stages of this relationship in a specific
order. The essay is broken down into three chapters, each unfolding a particular stage of being-inthe-world: “I. Homeless,” “II. Imperiled,” and “III. Saved.” The first is the most basic state of
alienation, the second is the most extreme form of alienation (that inherently includes the first),
and the final is a saving from alienation and a restoration of belonging in the world.
The first chapter is titled “Homeless” because in his 1946 “Letter on Humanism,”
Heidegger gives the name “homelessness” to a particular kind of alienation and a condition of
living within the modern world. Homelessness signifies the stage of being-in-the-world that
unfolds when the human being falls out of their essential “dwelling.” The idea of dwelling is
crucial to homelessness because homelessness is precisely what happens when the human being
loses their dwelling place. In this letter, Heidegger writes that “language is the house of [Being].
In its home human beings dwell.”1 The role of the human as the dweller of language is to think

1

Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 239; [145].
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toward Being, in language. But when Being is not thought and when man does not stand in the
clearing in relation to Being, then language is treated as a mere means to an end. The human being
loses their essential dwelling place. In many ways I see homelessness as the most basic
manifestation of alienation in the world, the alienation of modern mundane living, brought about
by utilitarian language, a loss of thinking in the world, and a general attitude of the will to master.
“Homeless” contains three parts: 1. “Thinking Against Humanism, Metaphysics, and
Animal Rationale,” 2. “Dwelling in Language, Ek-statically Sustaining die Lichtung,” and 3.
“Being’s Withdrawal.” In the first part of the chapter, “Thinking Against Humanism, Metaphysics,
and Animal Rationale,” I explore the ways in which metaphysics and humanism contribute to the
neglect of properly thinking toward Being in its essence. In “Dwelling in Language, Ek-statically
Sustaining die Lichtung,” I address what this “proper essence” of Being is and how Being,
language, and the human being essentially relate to one another. In this portion of the chapter I
will tease out the idea that language houses Being and is the dwelling place of the human being.
Furthermore, I will address the role of the human being in this dwelling. And lastly, in “Being’s
Withdrawal” I will deepen our understanding of how exactly the loss of dwelling— i.e.,
homelessness—has come about, and how Being has withdrawn from the world in the face of
homelessness.
The second chapter, “Imperiled,” deals with the most extreme form of alienation in the
world: the kind that is brought about by modern technique. For this reason, this chapter will be
primarily grounded in Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technique.” In this text, Heidegger
traces the ways in which modern technique’s essence, Ge-stell, has become the dominant way that
Being unconceals itself, or makes itself manifest to us, in the modern age. Heidegger writes that
“technology is in its essence a destiny within the history of being and of the truth of being, a truth
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that lies in oblivion.”2 Ge-stell covers up the truth of Being and in the reign of Ge-stell all beings
come to relate to one another as objects to be placed and ordered for the furthering of ends. Under
the reign of Ge-stell thrives the will to mastery, and in such a way the human being is imperiled in
the highest sense, for the human being is the furthest away from their essential dwelling. This is
what Heidegger refers to as the “peril” of Being. In many ways the peril of homelessness is
different from Ge-stell’s peril, and throughout this chapter I highlight the differences between the
two. Nevertheless, they both function as the primary modes of modern alienation, both driving the
human being out of their dwelling place.
This chapter is made up of four parts: “What is Technique?,” “What is Ge-stell?,” “Gestell’s Domination,” and “The Possibility of an Alternate Destiny.” The first section defines and
situates technique within Heidegger’s thinking, unpacking the distinction he makes between the
old ways of technique and the new. Technique was not always bound up with the will to master
and treatment of all that is as mere means. Heidegger argues that this is development of modern
technique manifests precisely in modern technique’s essence: Ge-stell. The second section asks
after Ge-stell, defining what Ge-stell is and how exactly all beings come to relate solely as means
to ends and objects to be ordered under the unfolding of Ge-stell. This brings us to the third part
of the chapter “Ge-stell’s Domination.” In this section I discuss the extremity of Ge-stell as not
only the exclusive way that beings relate but also the exclusive way in which Being unconceals
itself. Because of its extremity, Ge-stell is the highest peril of our relation to Being. Finally, in
“The Possibility of an Alternate Destiny,” I introduce the idea of a potential saving from the peril
of being-in-the-world. The extremity of Ge-stell as the destiny of Being’s unconcealment makes
the danger of technique manifest, but out of the danger of technique comes forth the possibility of

2

Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 259; [171].
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an alternative way of relating to Being, a different destiny of Being, which Heidegger refers to as
‘the saving.’
The third chapter, “Saved” explores how a save may grow from out of this peril that has
engulfed being-in-the-world. This chapter works between several essays in the collection of
Heidegger’s works titled Poetry, Language, Thought. In this chapter I will explain the importance
of the save arising from the peril, and the function of the human being in overcoming the peril and
bringing-forth the save. Heidegger tells us that “the same poet, [i.e., Hölderlin] from whom we
heard the words ‘But where peril is, grows/ What saves also.’ tells us: ‘. . . poetically dwells man
on this earth.’”3 Here we are given new light to the dwelling of the human being as not only a
linguistic dwelling, but more essentially a poetic dwelling. For reasons that will be made explicitly
clear, poetry is language in its highest essence. Poetry, as opposed to the language of utility or
jargon, speaks to language as the house of Being and the dwelling place of the human. Therefore,
poetry is the saving. It is only from its poetic essence that the save holds such radical potential for
bringing-forth restoration of the relation between the human being and dwelling. The saving comes
out of the experience of alienation but opens up a radically different way of being-in-the-world
that returns Being to its essence.
“Saved” is composed of three sections: “Overcoming the Peril,” “The Venturesome Poet,”
and “Dwelling in the Save.” The first section of the chapter establishes the peril as the site of the
save and the human being’s role in overcoming the peril. Although the human being is crucial in
the saving, their role is not one of mastery, but rather one of thoughtful care and attentiveness.
Thus, “The Venturesome Poet” is about the heroic poet who goes into the peril, listens and looks
attentively, and hears the poetic call of the saving, sees its flashing light from out of the perilous

3

Martin Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technique,” p. 30; [35].
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darkness, and responds accordingly. This section also redefines poetry within the framework of
the saving, positing the poetic as that which saves and restores the dwelling of the human being.
In the last section, “Dwelling in the Save,” we explore dwelling as a question of belonging. Human
beings dwell poetically in their belonging to Being, thus poetry as the saving brings us back to our
dwelling from out of our alienated way of being-in-the-world.
Indeed, our world seems to be fraught with estrangement, isolation, and meaninglessness.
Sometimes, in our openness, we become overpowered by the sense of dread of that comes with
living in such an alienated world. Sometimes, we close ourselves off to everything in order to cope
with such pain and loss. It’s a defense mechanism of grief. But sometimes, out of our open
sensitivity to existence, we feel not only the alienation of reality, but the interconnectedness of the
real. Opening ourselves up to the world of Being can lead to poetic creation. And out of poetic
creation we can build a new world, we can become poetic again.

12

I. Homeless
In Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” he situates the relationship between Being and
language as one that is profoundly interconnected, writing that “language is the house of [Being,
and] in its home human beings dwell.”4 He tells us that the human being, as the dweller of this
home, must sustain the relationship between language and Being. How the human being (Dasein)
may sustain this relationship is by thinking toward, and thus caring for Being; caring for Being is
essential to Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein. Thus, when the human being no longer carefully
thinks toward Being, and attempts to become the master of all beings and Being— failing to make
the necessary distinction between beings and Being because all becomes posited as means to the
ends of mastery—the relationship between language and Being is severed. The human being is the
one who suffers from this severing, for the home that houses the human being’s essence (i.e.
language) crumbles, driving the human away from the Being they belong to. Heidegger gives the
name homelessness to the split that unfolds between the human and their house of Being, and in
this chapter the question of homelessness will be my primary concern.
By way of investigating the claim that language houses Being and is the dwelling place of
the human, I will work through Heidegger’s rich vocabulary, teasing out the linguistic nuances in
order to arrive at a clear understanding of what exactly it could mean, and how the human being
finds themselves expelled from this home. Heidegger illustrates Being in its relation to language
in a rich and highly particularized vocabulary. Many people are often turned off by Heidegger’s
very specific language and writing style, accusing him of being intentionally difficult and
inaccessible. I do not wish to invalidate these claims, but I am drawn to the language he explores
4

Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 239; [145].
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precisely because of its specificity. His emphasis on language opens up the space in which words
can reclaim their agency and language can bring-forth meaning once again. Furthermore, in our
meditation on language, language can bring the meaning of Being to us (or us to Being).
Heidegger does not “use” difficult language, rather his writing thinks deeply about
language, and particularly about the language of Being. The purpose of this linguistic meditation
is not accessibility or utility, and I do not mean this in an elitist way. Being, or more specifically,
the thinking of Being, is always available to all of us. Insofar as we are human beings, we are all
able to think about language and the primordial power it holds to draw us back into the immanent
and let Being shine-froth. Why I say there is no accessible or utilitarian “point” is because
Heidegger is pushing away any “teleological,” purposive ends; his meditations on language and
Being are not for the sake of positing value, concrete outcomes, and tangible findings. For that
would be precisely the kind of thinking (i.e., scientific-positivism or metaphysical thinking) that
Heidegger is against. He sees these categories of thought as consumed by the will to master and
universalize— driving the human being further away from their essence and into homelessness.
Thus, this exploration is not necessarily “useful” or “productive.” The end of the pursuit lies in
itself, for to think carefully about language and Being is to dwell in the house of Being.
In the first section I will focus on Heidegger’s critique of humanism and metaphysics that
he presents in his letter. Specifically, how these two modes of thinking misunderstand the essential
nature of the human being and neglect properly thinking towards Being by failing to distinguish
between Being and beings.
The next section I will ground Heidegger’s understanding of the nature of the human being,
language, and Being in their essential relation to one another. To do this I will turn to his passage
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that posits language as the house of Being and the dwelling place of the human. This section will
address the responsibility of the human’s dwelling and what it means to dwell.
In the final section I will ask the question of the loss of dwelling, i.e., homelessness. This
section will explore how homelessness arises from the absence of thinking toward Being and the
obsession with value, order, and the will to mastery. When Being is not thought by the human
being in language, we lose our proper dwelling. In such a way Being withdraws from the world
and we become homeless.

Thinking Against Humanism, Metaphysics, and Animal Rationale
Although I will be moving between multiple works of Heidegger’s in an attempt to
investigate language as the house of Being and the human being’s homelessness, the “Letter on
Humanism” will occupy a central position in this investigation. This text is a response to a French
school teacher, Jean Beaufret, who posed the question: “How can we restore meaning to the word
humanism?”5 Heidegger takes issue with Beaufret’s question, arguing that it “proceeds from [his]
intention to retain the word ‘humanism.’”6 Generally speaking he takes issue with all “True,‘isms,” as he calls them. But ‘humanism’ is a particularly a fraught notion for Heidegger, and he
proceeds to extensively critique it.
Heidegger assures Beaufret that his critique of humanism is not a devaluing of humankind;
it does not “promote the inhumane [nor deprecate] the dignity of the human being,” but is a
reevaluation of the human being.7 He opposes humanism because he does not think that it “[sets]
the humanitas of the human being high enough,” rather it neglects what he finds to be essential to

5

Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 241; [147].
Ibid, 241; [147].
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the human being.8 He writes, “the sole implication is that the highest determinations of the essence
of the human being in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of the human being,” and
“to that extent the thinking in Being and Time is against humanism.”9 In part, his opposition to
humanism has much to do with its conceptualization of the human being as mere ‘animal
rationale.’ Heidegger is arguing that by defining the human being as animal rationale,
metaphysics and humanism neglect the dignity of the human. Heidegger argues that they think “of
the human being [only on] the basis of animalitas … not in the direction of his humanitas.”10 By
neglecting to think toward one’s humanitas, which is to say toward its essence (which for
Heidegger is certainly not animalitas), metaphysics and humanism fail to think toward the truth
the human being. And for Heidegger, the truth of Being dwells in the house of language.11
“Animal rationale” derives from the Greek ζῷον λόγοϛ ἔχον12 (zoon logon echon), but
according to Heidegger is not a direct Latin translation. Instead, he suggests that its meaning has
been filtered through the lens of metaphysics. 13 The metaphysical conditioning of “animal
rationale” has deteriorated the original meaning, thus losing sight of zoon logon echon:
The position which looked at the human with the definition “animal rationale” as its guide
saw them in the sphere of other Daseins [Daseinenden] with them in the mode of life
(plants, animals) and indeed as a being which has language (logon echon), which addresses
and discusses its world—a world initially there for it in the dealings it goes about in its
praxis, its concern taken in a broad sense. The later definition “animal rationale,” “rational
animal,” which was indifferently understood simply in terms of the literal sense of the
words, covered up the intuition which was the soil out of which this definition of human
being originally arose.14

8
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ζῷον λόγοϛ ἔχον translates to zoon logon echon, or a living being that has logos. (Stuart Elden, “Reading Logos as
Speech: Heidegger, Aristotle and Rhetorical Politics,” p. 282)
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The primordial spirit or “intuition” of zoon logon echon indicates that the human being is a
linguistic being, or a being that is endowed with speech. Heidegger does not deny this claim, as
the above passage shows, it in fact places emphasis on the human being as a particular kind of
being: Dasein. The problem is that metaphysics takes its translation of “animal rationale” literally.
Consequently, the focus is shifted to “animal,” shedding light on a tangential issue Heidegger takes
with metaphysics: “Metaphysics does not think the difference between Being and beings.
Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of Being itself. Nor does it therefore ask in what way the
essence of the human being belongs to the truth of Being. ”15
The “Letter on Humanism” is thus a response not only to Jean Beaufret, but to the
metaphysical and humanist traditions; these traditions ultimately do not ask after Being in the way
Heidegger attempts to. The stated defects Heidegger sees in metaphysics are critical to
understanding what exactly he is doing in this text and in his broader philosophical thinking. The
distinction between Being and beings is of the utmost importance to Heidegger and is a foundation
upon which his thought lies. In Being and Time, he asserts that das Sein des Seins ist nicht selbst
ein Seiendes (“the Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity.”)16 Beings is its essential truth is not a
thing; Being is both everywhere and nowhere, unable to be pinned down and mastered by the
human being. By failing to explicitly make the distinction between beings and Being, metaphysics
cannot and does not ask after truth of Being. And if the truth of Being is ignored then too is the
Wesen of the human being.17The oblivion of the distinction between beings and Being, and the
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In footnote 14 of Technique and the Turn, “The Question Concerning Technique,” the translators write:
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“Question Concerning Technique,” p. 10.)
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subsequent shortcomings in thought, contribute to the rise of homelessness. When Being is posited
as an object it is seen as something to be mastered, no longer does the human being think from
care and in language in its essential sense. Instead, the will to will dominates in a language of
utility. In such a way, the human being is driven out of their Wesen, becoming alienated from their
truth.
With Heidegger, I find that the thinking of, about, and towards Being is a crucial part of
being human. To meditate on Being is to ponder about ourselves and where we come from. So,
what happens when this kind of thinking is not being thought? What happens when the truth of
Being is ignored, or when it becomes corroded by fictional systems of value and the mastery of
techne? The result is we are no longer to dwell in language, in the house of being, and we become
homeless.
Thus far, we have situated the “Letter on Humanism” as a text that—as opposed to the
dominant thinking of metaphysics and humanism—1. distinguishes between Being and beings, 2.
asks after the truth of Being, and 3. attempts to understand how the Wesen of the human being
belongs to Being’s truth and dwells in language. By way of my investigation of the claim that
“language is the house of Being [and] in its home human beings dwell,”18 I will offer a reading of
Heidegger’s thinking through of the above tasks. Heidegger’s emphasis on the need to think about
the above tasks is in response to a general lack of thought—and such a lack is the driving force
behind homelessness.
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Dwelling in Language, Ek-statically Sustaining die Lichtung
Before understanding how homelessness is a loss of the human being’s dwelling and a
neglection of Being and language, we must ground these terms within Heidegger’s understanding
of their essential relation:
Language is the house of [Being]. In its home human beings dwell. Those who think and
those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship
accomplished the manifestation of [Being] insofar as they bring this manifestation to
language and preserve it in language through their saying.19

At the most rudimentary level, this passage tells us that there is a fundamental relation between
language and Being, as language is the home that Being is housed in. Furthermore, in this home
dwells the human being, and it is the human being—the thinking being—who guards this home
and thus preserves Being in language.
Out of his rejection of animalitas and embrace humanitas, he introduces the concept of the
human being’s ‘ek-sistence.’ Heidegger posits, that “what the human being is—or, as it is called
in the traditional language of metaphysics, the essence of the human being—lies in [their] eksistence.”20 This concept of ‘ek-sistence’ is not equivalent to the traditional, Platonic notion of
existentia, “which means actuality in contrast to the meaning of essentia as possibility.”21 But what
is this ek-sistence? And how exactly does the Wesen of the human being lie in their ek-sistence?
In the following passage Heidegger addresses these questions:
Metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that the human being essentially
occurs in [their] essence only where [they are] claimed by [Being]. Only from that claim
‘has’ [the human being] found that wherein [their] essence dwells. Only from this dwelling
does [the human being] ‘have’ ‘language’ as the home that preserves the ecstatic for [their]
essence. Such standing in the clearing of [Being] I call the ek-sistence of human beings.22
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Again, we are given another critique of metaphysics. Insofar as metaphysics does not distinguish
between beings and Being, it is implausible that metaphysics could be open to the ‘simple essential
fact’ of the human being’s essence manifest only in its being claimed by Being. For Heidegger,
the Wesen of the human being has nothing to do with notions of an “immortal soul, the power of
reason, or the character of a person.”23 The Wesen of the human being is the ability to dwell—to
dwell is to be human. Within the human’s dwelling they are granted language, and language
enables the human to care and think toward Being. In such a way language preserves both the
human being and Being’s Wesen.
As the passage on ek-sistence shows, the words that indicate ownership (i.e., “has”/“have”)
are parenthetically inscribed. This is an intentional move, as the parenthesis resist the modern
discourse that upholds ‘man’ as master. Language does not belong to the human being, the human
being belongs to language. Heidegger rejects the idea that human Wesen is defined by “the power
of reason” not only because he simply thinks that it is incorrect, but also because it adheres to
τέχνη (techne). And for Heidegger, technical mastery, alongside homelessness, is how we have
found ourselves in the peril of Being’s unconcealing, an idea that I will unfold in the following
chapter.
The Wesen of the human unfolds linguistically—when the human being is claimed by
Being, their Wesen is given to them from Being, through language. In this regard, language is the
home that houses and preserves human Wesen. This process — of a human being that is claimed
by Being discovering the dwelling place of their Wesen, that dwelling place being language — is
also understood by Heidegger as “standing in the clearing of [Being].”24 This ek-static standing
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out, into the clearing [die Lichtung] of Being, is what he refers to as the ek-sistence of human
beings. For Heidegger, ek-sistence is what distinguishes humans from other beings.25 In Western
thinking, he is illustrating a new way to conceive of the human as a being separate from other
‘beings,’ by the human potential to stand in the clearing of Being—the potential to ek-sist.
How are we to imagine die Lichtung and how Dasein stands in die Lichtung, as the eksisting one? To begin with, “the human being is, and is human, insofar as [they are] the ek-sisting
one.” 26 Meaning, to be human is to stand in die Lichtung and sustains the ek-static relation.
Heidegger tells us that “the clearing itself is [Being].”27 And in this open clearing of Being, the
human being stands out. Dasein stands out into the clearing because “[Being] itself, which as the
throw has projected the Wesen of the human being into ‘care,’ is as this openness. Thrown
[Entwurf] in such a fashion, the human being stands ‘in’ the openness of [Being].”28,29 It is also
important to take note of the word “sustain.” As the ek-sisting one, Dasein’s act of sustaining die
Lichtung is comparable to their guarding of the linguistic house of Being.
As the ek-sistent one, the human being is also ‘being-in-the-world.’ Heidegger postulates
that “for us the ‘world’ does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings but the openness of
[Being].”30 In this sentence, Heidegger is distancing himself from the traditional understanding of
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‘world’ and its relation to beings; thereby separating himself, once again, from metaphysics. As
Heidegger tells us, the world is primordially the openness of Being. Thus, Dasein and the world
happen equiprimordially; there is no human world without Dasein, and there is no Dasein without
the world.
To be-in-the-world is to dwell. Dasein, in their essential dwelling, may build out of this
dwelling and into the world through thinking: “thinking builds upon the house of [Being], the
house in which the jointure of [Being], in its destinal unfolding, enjoins the essence of the human
being in each case to dwell in the truth of [Being]. This dwelling is the essence of ‘being-in-theworld.’”31 Here, we are provided with another formulation of being-in-the-world as dwelling in
the truth of Being. I understand the ek-sistence of Dasein to mean standing in die Lichtung, out
into the truth of Being, and ek-statically sustaining it. Although Heidegger’s thinking often appears
to passively construct human experience—for example, the human being is claimed by Being and
is given language— there is an inherent responsibility of being-in-the-world. This active
responsibility is to think toward Being, and in thinking toward Being, sustain the clearing of Being.
Heidegger writes that “as ek-sisting, the human being sustains Da-sein in that he takes the Da, the
clearing of [Being], into ‘care.’”32 As stated previously, the concept of care is closely related to
guardianship. It is important we remember that in the primary quote of interest: “Language is the
house of [Being]. In its home human beings dwell. Those who think and those who create with
words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplished the manifestation of
[Being] insofar as they bring this manifestation to language and preserve it in language through
their saying.” 33 We are told that the guardians are thinkers, and they create with words. This

31

Ibid, 272; [188-189].
Ibid, 249; [158].
33
Ibid, 239; [145].
32

22
linguistic creation, or saying, is the synonymous with thinking. What he means by saying is not a
mere act of speaking. The saying that is the thinking of Being is a revelation of Being in its truth:
“thinking in its saying merely brings the unspoken word of [Being] to language... The usage of
‘bring to language’ employed here is now to be taken literally. Being comes, clearing itself, to
language.”34 Through thinking and saying, Being is brought to language, with it its unspoken word.
Thinking is thought and said through Dasein, therefore Dasein is the guardian of die Lichtung and
the dweller of the house of Being.
Heidegger gives the name “shepherd” to Dasein in their role of guardianship: “the human
being is not the lord of beings. The human being is the shepherd.”35 This formulation is vital to
understanding his complication of the categories of activity and passivity. To care for, to guard, to
shepherd, and to think, are all deeds that challenge the active-passive binarism: agency lies with
the actor, but the acting resist attitudes of mastery and lordship. Part of this caring and shepherding
is a letting be: to think Being is to let Being think.36 Although I do not wish to belabor, it is essential
to highlight once more that as human beings, we must think Being — begging the question: what
happens when we do not think Being?

Being’s Withdrawal
Our exploration has, to varying degrees, touched upon Heidegger’s carrying out of the
following projects: 1. distinguishing between Being and beings, 2. asking after the truth of Being,
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and 3. attempting to understand how the Wesen of the human being belongs to Being’s truth—i.e.,
the dwelling of the human being. The first point is what opens up the space for thinking towards
Being; without this distinction, the type of thinking Heidegger is asking for becomes impossible.
The space that this distinction opens up or uncovers, is to a certain extent, the clearing of Being.
The clearing of Being is the truth of Being, and Being clears itself in thinking. This brings us to
the second point, as die Lichtung is the truth of Being, and it is in this clearing— the truth of
Being—that Dasein stands out into. Insofar as the human being ek-statically stands out into die
Lichtung, and sustains it, the human being’s Wesen belongs to Being’s truth— this is the dwelling
of the human being.
These thought-trains matter because they are thinking Being. Part of Heidegger’s objection
to metaphysics, and ultimately “philosophy,” is that they do not think Being and are blind to the
aforementioned points. Returning to his letter, Heidegger illustrates the consequences of such
blindness and thoughtlessness— a thoughtlessness that, although philosophy and metaphysics are
guilty of, is additionally a result of the modern condition. He addresses this consequence by the
term: “homelessness.” The causation of homelessness is more complex than the truth of Being not
being thought, therefore necessary questions of inquiry include: what is being thought instead of
Being and its truth, and what type of thinking leads to homelessness?
A massive preoccupation that has taken hold of metaphysics’ thinking and in effect has
covered up the truth of Being, is the search for what is knowable and provable in alignment with
‘correctness,’ a kind of scientific-positivism. In Heidegger’s essay, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,”
he suggests that metaphysics defines the essence of truth as correctness (of gaze, apprehension,
representation, et cetera) as opposed to ἀλήθεια. Αλήθεια (aletheia) means truth as unconcealment
and is a critical term to this project. Insofar as Being makes itself manifest to us in the world, it
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unconceals itself. When we, as human beings, dwell essentially—which is to say in the truth of
Being— Being unconceals in its proper Wesen. But when the truth of Being is concealed by the
reductive equating of truth as the accurate representation of what is seeable and knowable, Being
does not unconceal itself to us in its true Wesen. Instead of thinking toward Being, we are
misdirected into the inquiry of beings and their “truth,” but we aren’t even doing that really,
because our idea of “truth” is so skewed by the discourse of mastery. Heidegger argues that this
conception begins with Plato and is displayed in its most extreme consequence through Nietzsche’s
“determination of truth as the incorrectness of thinking.”37
This misguided philosophical preoccupation has much to do with the influence of scientific
discourse and the notion of praxis [πρᾶξις]:

“Philosophy” has been in the constant predicament of having to justify its existence before
the “sciences.” It believes it can do that most effectively by elevating itself to the rank of a
science. But such an effort is the abandonment of the essence of thinking. Philosophy is
hounded by the fear that it loses prestige and validity if it is not a science. Not to be science
is taken as a failing that equivalent to being unscientific. Being as the element of thinking,
is abandoned by the technical interpretation of thinking.38

As this passage illustrates, “philosophy” has been corroded by scientific values, and thus turns
away from the essence of thinking. Heidegger tells us that the essence of thinking is simple, and
“through its simple essence, the thinking of [Being] makes itself unrecognizable to us.”39 Due to
the simplicity of the thinking of Being,40 we are kept from it; as opposed to being drawn to the
simple, to the thinking of Being, we look only for that which is ‘philosophically’ or scientifically

37

Martin Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,’” p.179; [139].
Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 249; [146].
39
Ibid, 275; [192].
40
Although the thinking of Being has a simple essence, it is “simplest and highest simultaneously” (Letter 239; [145]).
The multiplicitous nature of Being is made apparent not only in terms of “simplicity” and “highness,” but also
spatially: “Being is essentially farther than all beings and yet nearer to the human being than every being (i.e., rock,
beast, work of art, machine, angel, or God). Being is the nearest. Yet the nearest remains the farthest” (252; [162]).
38

25
deemed successful in πρᾶξις. I would also argue that beyond a measure of success, there is an
element of readiness, accessibility, and mastery. What is easily seen with the eye is the world of
appearance. Under the visible world may lie a spring of originary Being, but it is covered up by
appearance. We are fixated on what is seeable and knowable, in part, because we are concerned
with what is able to be mastered. Metaphysics is unable to distinguish between Being and beings,
and focuses primarily on beings and on that which is knowable, thus does not think Being. But this
is not a problem that remains within the walls of “philosophy.” It has become a problem of the
world because Being is concealed everywhere under the will to mastery.
When Being is not thought by the human being it does not unconceal itself to the human
being in its true Wesen; Being withdraws from the world when it is not thought. In turning away
from the thinking of Being in its simple essence, we also turn away from language as the house of
Being. “Thinking attends to the clearing of [Being] in that it puts its saying of [Being] into language
as the home of ek-sistence;” thinking is how Dasein cares for Being. Thus, the relationship
between Being and language is severed when the thinking being, Dasein, is not thinking toward
Being.41 Being no longer brings itself to the clearing—to the place in which the human being
dwells as the ek-static one—through language.
Accompanying scientific thinking and πρᾶξις comes an attitude of appropriation and
mastery. Thinking that is consumed with beings and the world of appearances, tends to uphold an
attitude of “man” as master. Humanism often falls victim to this line of thought, championing the
idea that “man” (which defaults to white-male) has the potential to create himself, and destine the
world he wishes to live in. The desire to master first themselves and then the is the primary attitude
of the modern world. Often the notion mastery denotes physical conditions of bondage, but not
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necessarily the immaterial world of thinking and language. Heidegger pushes back against the
common idea that language is “man’s” tool. Language is not a reified tool that the human being
controls and dominates, only to further endless ends of ordering and mastery. Language, like
Being, is not an object at all. Rather, language is situated in the position of dominance in its
relation with the human being. This dominance is not to be seen in a belittling or negative sense,
for this relation is one of care. Only by way of language is Being’s truth unconcealed to the human
being, language cares for the human being in letting the human dwell. The human being similarly
shows care by listening to the language of Being and responding in thinking. It is a relationship of
ek-static sustaining.
When we fail to think of the Wesen of language as a revelation of Being, only positing
language as a means to further ends, a tool of mundane utility or empty rhetoric, language declines
and “falls out of its element:”

Much bemoaned of late, and too much lately, the decline of language is, however, not the
grounds for, but already the consequence of, the state of affairs in which language under
the dominance of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity almost irremediably falls out of
its element. Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of being.
Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of
domination over beings.42

In our sheer willing and attempts to impose mastery over the world, over thought, and over
language, language denies us its Wesen as our dwelling place. In the denial of the Wesen of
language, we are also denied the Wesen of ourselves. Just as language is the house of Being, it is
also “the home of human essence.”43 And “only because language is the home of the essence of
the human being can historical humankind and human beings not be at home in their language, so
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that for them language becomes a mere container for their sundry preoccupations.”44 When we
neglect language as the house of Being and treat language as utilitarian means to ends, we are no
longer at home in language. When we are not at home in language, we are homeless. In our
homeless state, idle talk has begun to dominate Being. We may understand “idle talk” as another
causation of homelessness. Heidegger states that “the widely and rapidly spreading devastation of
language not only undermines aesthetic and moral responsibility in every use of language; it arises
from a threat to the essence of humanity.” 45 The threat to humanity is the peril that is
homelessness—a peril that is rooted in a thoughtless causation.
Homelessness is the result of an attempt to universalize the world. The attempt of worldly
universalization, and thus an imposition of mastery, takes place when we turn away from Being
and, like metaphysics, think only toward beings. Homelessness happens when we turn away from
our Wesen as the shepherd of Being, and try to act as the lord of Being. World is to be understood
as both humanity and the open clearing of Being. For Heidegger, the collective world is not a
world of biology, nor is it a world of nationalism— it is a world of language. What Heidegger
means by language is something thoughtful and powerful; language is common, meaningful, and
destinal. Despite the commonality, particular to each home resides a specific language and
dialectic, in each home there are nuanced customs [Sitten] and culture. Different languages are
going to cultivate diverse conceptions of Dasein; and these differences are to be honored, as they
house Being. “Language” is not only a metaphorical dwelling in which Being resides, but also the
place in which are situated in the world, the place we call “home.” In this sense, Being is not
universal, therefore, we need not to infringe upon the homeland of others, nor seek to impose a
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universal conception onto them. When we attempt to universalize and enforce a mastery of
rationale over the world—or even forms of physical mastery — we forget Being in its true Wesen,
Being and language withdraw from the world.
The attempt at universalization is a threat to the Wesen of humanity; as language and being
recede from the humanity, the world becomes a homeless place for Dasein. The human being is
homeless because the lose the dwelling place of their essence. Estranged from Being and language,
the human being is also alienated from themselves. Heidegger writes that “homelessness so
understood consists in the abandonment of beings by [Being]. Homelessness is the symptom of
the oblivion of [Being]. Because of it the truth of [Being] remains unthought.”46 Not only does the
truth of Being remain unthought in the language of idle talk and metaphysics, it also remains
unthought in the dominant nihilist discourse. In nihilism there is no common sense to implicate
what is right or wrong and true or false; therefore, there can be no truth of Being in nihilism.
Nihilism offers a plethora of discordant values that are all competing with one another and
prohibiting the existing of a highest value. And in nihilism, there is no meaning, belonging to
anything. Thus, we come to see that nihilism is another facet of the same portrait of homeless, a
destiny of alienation. Language cannot be our home within nihilist modes of thinking, in this
discourse there is no such thing as homeland.
The problem for Heidegger is that “we let everything expire in a nihilism we invented for
ourselves with the aid of logic.”47 In this dissent we hear different aspects of his argument woven
together: the aid of logic that has led to the conception of the human being as “animal rationale,”
to the scientific corrosion of philosophical thought, and to the modern obsession with mastery.
Undoubtedly Heidegger issue with ‘logic.’ But he explicitly notes that when he speaks against
46
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‘logic,’ he is not arguing for irrationality. In actuality, he is pushing back against the position of
lordship that has led to destinal homelessness. He is asking for a more rigorous investigation into
concepts such as, “‘humanism,’ ‘logic,’ ‘values,’ ‘world,’ and ‘God.’”48 He is calling upon us to
be more critical of the fabricated valuing and devaluing that we take in oblivion as given and a
priori. Heidegger writes:
Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings:
be. Rather, valuing lets beings be: be valid- solely as the objects of its doing... to think
against values therefore does not mean to beat the drum for valuelessness and nullity of
beings. It means rather to bring the clearing of the truth of [Being] before thinking, as
against subjectivizing beings into mere objects.49

Being lets being be, and as Being withdraws and subjectivizing takes hold, beings are turned into
objects solely as means for furthering ends. By thinking against values and logic, Heidegger is
thinking towards truth and Wesen of Being, language, and the human being. He is trying to restore
a home in the face of homelessness. Valuing is a fictional ordering, it reifies and places and
approaches the world as only means to an end. In this state of sheer will, the agency of beings and
their thinking is corroborated— particularly that of the human being— for an end of mastery and
validity. We find the fingerprints of ‘ordering’ and ‘valuing’ all over the concept of animal
rationale; this concept does nothing else but drive us out of our house of Being and into the
pandemic of linguistic poverty and essential alienation. Heidegger writes that “expelled from the
truth of being, the human being everywhere circles around himself as animal rationale.”50
We have arrived at a situation in which Being has withdrawn, concealed by the will to
master and the obsession with valuing. Language has denied us its essence insofar as we treat it as
a mere means to further ends, a tool at our disposal. And in such withdrawal of Being and denial
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of language, we have lost our dwelling and are undergoing the peril of destinal homelessness—
alienated from our essence and circling around ourselves everywhere as animal rationale.
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II. Imperiled
Destinal homelessness is the condition in which Dasein lives in the modern world. In many
ways, the words ‘alienation’ and ‘worldlessness’ share spirit with Heidegger’s homelessness.51
What mutually exhilarates alienation, worldlessness, and homelessness, is an estrangement from
the immanence that animates existence. Heidegger would refer to this immanence as Being.
Somehow, we have cut ourselves off from the flow of Being, and in doing so, dissociated from a
part of ourselves: the part of ourselves that belongs to Being. Although seemingly abstract, this
says something about the concrete material conditions of the human being.
In the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger puts forth a portrait of homelessness that is driven
by the human being (Dasein) forgetting their role as the shepherd of Being and attempting to act
as the master of Being. By acting as master, Dasein drives themselves away from the Being they
belong to and its language that they are housed in, and into alienation. But the implications of
attempting mastery extend further than the mastery of Being, and this is where the material
consequence comes into play. Mastery also means mastery over other beings, human beings, and
nonhuman beings alike. The will to master doesn’t just exist in an abstract theoretical realm,
insofar as it is actually willed, there are tangible, repercussions for all the players. When situating
the will to master and universalize within the framework of destinal homelessness, we find that it
manifests itself in what is named “technique.” The unfolding of modern technique actualizes the
will to master as the dominant way in which Dasein relates to all beings in the modern age.
Heidegger introduces the concept of technique in his letter, writing that “technology is in
its essence a destiny within the history of being and of the truth of being, a truth that lies in
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oblivion.” 52 Technology, or more precisely modern technique, as a destiny of truth lying in
oblivion is in many ways the thesis of this chapter. In the letter, Heidegger briefly entangles
technique with the various causes of homelessness (i.e., metaphysics and humanism, correctness
as “truth,” scientific thinking and praxis [πρᾶξις], dogmatic values systems and “logic”) because
technique activates the will to master within these causes so to speak. Heidegger’s letter shows the
ways in which homelessness arises when the human being forgets Being in their pursuit of mastery,
and within this portrait technique is mentioned in passing. But in his essay “Die Frage nach der
Technik” (“The Question Concerning Technique”), Heidegger further develops the concept of
technique. Although homelessness is never explicitly mentioned in this text, there is an obvious
bridge between homelessness and technique. In “The Question Concerning Technique,” he gives
a different title to homelessness in the modern age: namely, the ‘age of Ge-stell.’ Both
homelessness and the age of Ge-stell signify an era in which everything has become subsumed
under a means to ends agenda, all (Being, human beings, and nonhuman beings alike) become
opportunities for mastery. Beings are unable to shepherd Being in such an age, and thus as Being
abandons us we find ourselves homeless, caught in an age of Ge-stell’s destiny.
In this chapter I will illustrate: 1. What technique is, 2. Exactly what Ge-stell—technique’s
Wesen—is and how it is that beings relate in an age of Ge-stell, 3. How Gestell has come to
dominate in the modern age, becoming the destiny (Geschick) of Being, which is to say that it is
the exclusive way of unconcealing, 4. The extremity of Ge-stell as the Geschick of Being makes
the danger of technique manifest. But within the danger of technique opens the possibility of
another way of relating to Being, or an alternative destiny of Being, which Heidegger calls the
saving.
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What is Technique?
At the outset I want to make three things explicitly clear. First, modern technique is a
particular way in which beings relate to one another, specifically that all beings become means to
an end. In “The Question Concerning Technique,” Heidegger writes that “we ask after technique
when we ask what it is.”53 When we ask after technique and what it is, we are given two answers:
“One says: technique is a means to ends. The other says: Technique is a doing of man.”54 But these
two facets of technique are to be thought together, insofar as ends are posited and means are
appropriated to achieve ends, there is a human actor instigating such a doing. Therefore, technique
also includes an implementation of sorts. It is not only an attitude of means to ends, but further a
carrying out by means of tools and machinery (i.e., technology). The composition of technique
encompasses all of these factors—means and end application of human action and implementation
as seen in technological development— in concert with one another. “To what technique is, belong
the readying and use of tool, implement, and machines, belongs what is readied and used itself,
belong the needs and ends they serve. The whole of these arrangements…is technique.”55 It is
important to underscore that the composition of technique does not lie solely on the machinery or
instruments. Rather, Heidegger is emphasizing that we not only build machinery and posit beings
as “objects,” but that we see it through that the machines we build and the beings we objectify are
carried out as means to serve our ends as self-appointed masters. In such a way, the will of ‘man’
becomes dominant, setting ‘man’ over and against all beings, including other humans.
The second point acknowledges that the means to an end approach is undoubtably nothing
new, it was embodied in the past of technique as well. But in the manifestation of technique today,
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the mastery of means to the completion of ends is its sole and highest concern. It is increasingly
the case that human beings are unable to look at, for example, a rock and let it be as it is as a
“rock.” For the most part, the study of rocks is not pursued to merely learn about their history as
autonomous nonhuman beings (tracing the rocks’ ancestry, learning whether they were underwater
or formed by tectonic collision, discovering which volcano is their birthplace). If the study of rocks
is being funded, it is most likely that what is learned about the mineral composition of a rock is
not for the sake of learning about the autonomous rock-being as an end in itself, but for the sake
of furthering ends in the name of utility. “How can this rock be used as an object to further human
ends?” Whether that end be a piece in a stone wall or mineral extraction, it is defined exclusively
by its use-value. Thus, we must distinguish the broader manifestation of means to an end in the
past against the poignant and all-encompassing manifestations of such a will of mastery today.
The final point is that technique is a way of unconcealing. Importantly so, there are various
ways of unconcealing. In the past technique unconcealed one way, and today technique unconceals
very differently.
I will not address these points as they are chronologically listed, in fact I will being with
the question of unconcealing. The chronology is of little significance because these are not linear
happenings, as the following analysis will show these three points regarding technique are
complexly entangled with one another. I highlight these points because they are of the utmost
importance in not only understanding what Heidegger’s portrait of technique is, but also
understanding how technique has become the only way Being is unconcealed in the modern age
of Ge-stell, the age of destinal homelessness.
To say that technique is an unconcealing, we must first call into question what an
unconcealing entails. The meaning of “unconcealing” can be traced back to ἀλήθεια (aletheia), the
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Greek word for the disclosure of truth. Unconcealing brings-forth truth. It is a bringing-forth that
“brings out of concealedness forth into unconcealedness,”56 it brings something forward and anew.
Furthermore, “bringing-forth ereignet sich only insofar as something concealed comes into the
unconcealed. This coming rests and soars in what we name unconcealing.” 57 Thus, there is an
interlaced happening between unconcealing and bringing-forth.
The Greek word ποίησις (poiesis) denotes a bringing-forth into existence something which
before was not. Heidegger posits that for the Greeks the kinds of ποίησις include: the making of
something with hands or as Heidegger calls it “hand-workly making,” artistic or poetic creation,
and φύσις (physis/nature) as “the arising-from-itself (das von-sich-her-Aufgehen).”58 These are all
ways of bringing-forth; through bringing-forth come “the grown thing of nature as well as the
made thing of handwork and the arts, each to their shining-forth.”59 Simply put, ποίησις happens
when something that did not exist before (i.e. a particular work of art) is created and thus brought
into the world of existence. The artwork came from concealedness into unconcealedness, just as
does the blossoming of a flower or the birth of a hymn. Thus, the bringing-forth—whether that be
of ‘hard-workly making,’ the arts, or φύσις—is a kind of unconcealing.
How technique fits into the equiprimordial relationship of ποίησις and ἀλήθεια, the
bringing-forth from concealment into unconcealment, is not immediately clear. Heidegger himself
raises the question we are asking: “what does the essence of technique have to do with
unconcealing?” A question to which he answers “all.”60 Technique, including modern technique,
is an unconcealing insofar as technique brings-forth something into existence that did not exist
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before. Naturally there are different ways of bringing-forth, unfolding as various forms of
unconcealing. This difference is not to be ignored, for “the unconcealing that dominates modern
technique, does not unfold itself in a bringing-forth in the sense of ποίησις.”61
In what follows, I will reproduce a series of examples provided by Heidegger that illustrate
modern technique as a different kind of unconcealing than that of technique in the past or ποίησις.
These examples will also demonstrate the manifestation of “the current representation
(Vorstellung) of technique, according to which it is a means and a human doing, [and] can therefore
be called the instrumental and anthropological determination of technique.”62 As previously stated,
the means to an end approach is nothing new but it takes omnipotent hold of technique as it
manifests today. Thus, Heidegger distinguishes this ‘current Vorstellung’ of technique as
“something thoroughly other and new,” against the “older hand-workly technique.”63
In Heidegger’s examples, he contrasts the “new” versus “old” way of technique, writing:
“naturally, a radar-station is less simple than a weather-vane. Naturally the readying of a radarstation requires the cooperation of various labor-processes of technical-industrial production.
Naturally a sawmill in a [secluded] Black Forest Valley is a primitive means in comparison to the
hydroelectric power-works in the Rhine river.” 64 The weather-vane and the sawmill are both
technologies that we produce to achieve an end of sorts. The weather-vane tells us the direction
that the wind is blowing, and we make decisions in accordance with the knowledge provided by
such a technology. The weather-vane’s telling my inform decisions from agriculture to travel. The
weather-vane moves with, not against the wind, the wind and the weather-vane are brought-forth
together. In the case of the sawmill, the presence of control and disharmony against are more
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visible, insofar as it is a technology that works logs into lumber that will be used to further ends.
But still, the sawmill works with what the trees gives. Even the sawmill, as it re-forms logs into
lumber, is much more straight-forward than the power-works in its singular task.
The primary distinction Heidegger is making is that a weather-vane allows us to know the
weather and have some understanding of it. Whereas the end of the hydro-electric power-works
on the Rhine is not determining the direction that the river flows. The aim of such technology is to
actually change how, why, and where it flows. The difference is entirely summed up in that “the
hydroelectric power plant is not built on the Rhine river as is the old wood bridge that for centuries
has bound shore to shore. Rather the river is built into the power plant.”65 We no longer work with
the autonomous nonhuman lifeforms and beings such as the wind, soil, forests, or rivers, we work
into them—we place demands on them and attempt to change them drastically to fit our own ends.
What the weather-vane tells us doesn’t really matter because we can simply seed the clouds and
cause precipitation. And we do this through technique insofar as we build machines and place our
wills into them so that the machine may become a means to our end of mastery.

In the mani-

festation of technique that insists a will to master, a panoptic instrumentalization unfolds. Although
all technique exemplifies a means to an end narrative, present day technique takes this
instrumentalization to entirely different level.
The four Aristotelian causes tell us more about the different kinds of unconcealing and how
we have today arrived at an instrumentalized means-ends determination of technique; for “where
ends are pursued, and means are employed, where the instrumental dominates, there sways
Ursächlichkeit, causality.”66 These four causes are outlined by Heidegger in this order: 1. causa
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materialis, 2. causa formalis, 3. causa finalis, 4. causa efficiens.67 Heidegger employs the creation
of a silver cup to explain each cause. 68 Causa materialis is the material (ὕλη) out of which
something is made; in the case of a silver cup, the causa materialis is the silver. The second cause,
causa formalis, indicates the form into which the material is set into (Gestalt); the form of a cup
as opposed to the form of a spoon, ring, et cetera). Causa finalis is the end or final cause, “e.g. the
sacrifice through which the needed cup is determined with respect to form and stuff.”69 Heidegger
places causa efficiens last to stress this particular cause, which is the effect, “the finished actual
cup, the silversmith.”70 Why this stress is significant will soon become apparent.
After outlining the four causes, Heidegger posits that “what technique represented
(vorgestellt) as means is, uncovers itself when we trace the instrumental back to the fourfold
causality.”71 But in order to understand how technique uncovers itself as a means to an end, we
must ask questions like: Why exactly are there four, and not three or five causes? And how is it
that these causes belong together in such an incorporated manner? Heidegger argues that we may
begin to ground the current determination of technique as a means to an end only by first asking
these questions.
At work in our understanding of causality lies an assumption of causation qualified only
insofar as it generates productive effects: “One has been accustomed for a long time to represent
(vorstellen) cause as what works (das Bewirkende). Here working is: attaining results, effects.”72
We measure “cause” by the palpable and subsequent effects, and it is causa efficiens “that
determines all causality in a measure-giving way.”73
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Heidegger suggests that we have casted aside the technical final cause, causa finalis, and
focus only on the effectiveness as a measure of finality. He tells us that the four causes for the
Greeks were understood as dependent and necessarily accompanying; they were “ways of beingresponsible that belong with one another.”74 For the Greeks, the idea of cause was not grounded
necessarily in the notion of effectiveness, but instead a kind of mutual responsibility: “what we
name Ursache and the Romans name causa, is called by the Greeks αίτιον, what is responsible
(verschuldet) for something else.”75 Each cause is responsible for the other: the silver is obliged to
that which makes up the silver; the cup (form) is similarly indebted to the silver (material); but the
outer-look (εἶδος) of the cup as a cup, or ‘sacrificial instrument’ to use Heidegger’s terminology,
as opposed to presenting itself as a spoon or ring, means that the sacrificial instrument is beholden
to its outer-look as a cup. Thus, “the silver into which the outer-look as cup is let in, the outer-look
into which the silver appears, are both in their ways co-responsible for the sacrificial instrument.”76
There is a thankful symbiosis between these causalities insofar as they let each other be.
The co-responsibility of causa materialis and causa formalis is entangled with the third
cause insofar as the effect is what enables the cup to be defined as ‘sacrificial instrument:’ “what
defines, ends (beendet) the thing.”77 But an end does not mean a ceasing of existence, for it is from
the end that it may begin to be as it is set or effected, “to be what it will be after its being-setforth.”78 This moment of ending or completion correlates to τέλος— which Heidegger argues is
often mistranslated as “aim” or “purpose.” For the notion of “aim” and “purpose” would be more
in alignment with the measure of effectiveness. Instead, “the τέλος is responsible for what as stuff
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and what as outer-look are together responsible for the sacrificial instrument.” 79 Responsible
togetherness is central to this portrait of causality, and causa efficiens remains the last cause in this
entanglement of responsibility. The silver-smith plays a role in the responsibility of “the lyingready-before-us,” but not because the silver-smith “by working, works out the finished sacrificial
cup as the effect of a making.”80 The role of the human was not to reach an ultimate end from mere
means. Rather, the silver-smith “takes into account and gathers” causa materialis, formalis, and
finalis as counterparts of responsibility.81
Heidegger makes the claim that the Greek’s hardly had a name for this causa efficiens
because for them, within the framework of the four causes, the role of the human was no more
important than the material, form, or end. The human played a role in the making, but in no way
did it dominate as the primary cause as it does in the modern configuration of technique. Modern
technique upholds causa efficiens—an idea of cause that was not even present in the minds of the
Greeks according to Heidegger— as technique and vice versa. This is a radically different view
from that in which “the four ways of being-responsible bring something into appearance.”82 As
opposed to the technical togetherness of the four causes, modern technique commits a fallacy of
misplaced concreteness, conflating a part (causa efficiens) as the whole (four cause system of
togetherness).
The four causes do not master something into being, instead “they let it come-forth in
presence. They release it therein and leave it in so, namely in its completed advent. Beingresponsible has the ground-trait of this letting-in in the advent. In the sense of such letting-in,
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being-responsible is a Ver-an-lassen.” 83 By breaking down Veranlassen (the German word
expressing “to cause, occasion, to bring about”) into Ver-an-lassen, Heidegger is playing with the
word, restoring it to its root meaning of “completing a letting-in.”84
Ver-an-lassen, a letting come forth, is the way in which the four causes, acting responsibly
together, bring something to appearance. Consequently, we arrive at a thought-train as follows:
“the ways of Veranlassung, the four causes, play…within bringing-forth;”85 and bringing-forth or
ποίησις is rooted in unconcealing or ἀλήθεια. Bringing-forth, which we know is a kind of
unconcealing, “gathers in itself the four ways of Veranlassung — causality — and sways through
them. In their domain belong purpose and means, belongs the instrumental.”86 Purpose, means,
and instrumentality are components of technique’s particular way of bringing-forth, and in its
bringing-forth, technique makes its way through unconcealing. This is a fact of all technique, past
and present. Wherein lies the difference is that for the Greeks the four causes were balanced and
mutually responsible, but today causa efficiens has come to be seen as the primary responsible
agent, the master over all bringing-forth.
Despite the meaningful distinctions that prevail between past and present technique, all
technique is a way of unconcealing and bringing-forth. Today, we abstract this bringing-forth as
an anthropological doing, instrumentalization at the hand of the human, and we place our will to
master in the machine. But still, technique remains an unconcealing.
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What is Ge-stell?

We have put forward that technique is a way of unconcealing, and modern technique a new
way of unconcealing in which beings relate as means to an end. But we have yet to show the
precise method through which beings enact this relation. We have said that humans place their will
to master in the machine, but we have not illustrated exactly how. To do so, we will turn toward
the Wesen of modern technique. The Wesen of modern technique will tell us more about
technique’s unconcealment, for the realm of unconcealment is where the Wesen of technique lies;
“technique west in the domain where unconcealing and unconcealedness, where ἀλήθεια, where
truth happens.”87
Heidegger calls the Wesen of modern technique Ge-stell.88 Ge-stell ordinarily “signifies
the likes of a stand, a rack, a supporting framework. But Heidegger means nothing of that kind.”89
He breaks the word down into two parts: the first component, ge-, expresses a totality or
completeness of the second component, stellen, which is a setting in place. 90 Ge-stell thus
expresses a complete setting in place.
Stellen is at the core of Heidegger’s portrait of technique, for “the unconcealing that sways
in modern technique is a summoning (herausfordern), that puts (stellt) to nature the demand to
deliver energy that can be furthered (herausgefördert) and stored up as energy.” The approach of
stellen, a putting into place, stands in stark contrasts to the bringing-forth of ποίησις. Modern
technique unconceals as an ordering (Bestellen) of beings (i.e. other human beings or “nature”) as
means in which energy is ‘effectively’ produced and stored up as an end. Heidegger asks: “But
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does not this hold also true for the old wind-mill? No. Her wings of course turn in the wind, they
remain submitted immediately to its blowing. But the wind-mill does not disclose energies of aircurrent so as to store them up.”91 In layman’s terms, this distinction may be boiled down to one of
exploitation and selfishness—modern technique unconceals everything as something to be
selfishly exploited.
Heidegger carries us through a sequence of instances that depict this exploitative ordering
and unconcealing of modern technique:
A tract of land is summoned into the furthering of coal and ore. The earth-kingdom
unconceals itself now as coal-reserve, the soil as ore-storage. Other is the appearance of
the field that formerly the peasant ordered (bestellte), in which ordering (bestellen) still
was: caring and tending. The doing of the peasant does not summon the arable soil. In the
sowing of corn, it submits the seed to the forces of growth, and heeds their thriving.92

The land is summoned as a means to pursue further ends of ‘productive’ exploitation. In this
summoning of modern technique, the earth is reified solely as raw material. In the past, the
ordering (bestellen) was one of tender care. Seen from the perspective of the four causes, the
sowing of corn is a bringing-forth that is affected not merely by the farmer, but by the ‘forces of
growth.’
Meanwhile the ordering (Bestellung) of fields also has fallen into the wake of another kind
of ordering (Bestellen) that defies (stellt) nature. It defies (stellt) her in the sense of
summoning. Agriculture is now motorized nutrition-industry. The air is put (gestellt) to
delivering nitrogen, the soil to ore, the ore e.g. to uranium, and this to atomic energy, which
can be released for destruction or peaceful use.93

No longer is ordering a process of mindful care and attentive cultivation, togetherness is disrupted
by an ordering of standing-against, an ordering that ‘defies (stellt) nature.’ “The unconcealing that
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dominates modern technique, has the character of putting upon (Stellen) in the sense of
summoning” 94 because the air, soil, et cetera, is put in such a way that its energy may be
summoned from it.
This summoning furthers itself in an auto-cyclical, insatiable manner: “It furthers in that it
discloses and exposes (herausstellt). But this furthering remains put (abgestellt) in advance to
another furthering, i.e. to driving forward to the greatest possible use at the smallest expense.”95
The continuous process of putting (Stellen) and summoning materially unfolds as follows:
The coal furthered in the coal-reserve is not put (gestellt) simply to be present somewhere.
It is stored, i.e. in place (Stelle) for the ordering (Bestellung) of the sun-warmth
accumulated in it. The latter is summoned into heat, which is ordered (bestellt) to deliver
steam, the pressure of which drives the drive through which the factory remains driven.96

All ordering of Ge-stell has intention in the sense of mastery but not attention in the sense of care;
careful cultivation has become a complex arrangement of aggressive transformation. Theoretically
the process unfolds like so:
The energy concealed in nature is unlocked, the so disclosed is transformed, the so
transformed is stored up, the so stored up is distributed again, and the distributed is
switched-over anew. Disclosing, transforming, storing-up, distributing, switching-over are
ways of unconcealing.97

Systematically, energy is manipulated in a repetitive and manifold process: ‘unlock,’ ‘disclose,’
‘transform,’ ‘store-up,’ ‘switch-over.’ More than a process of ordering, this system is way of
unconcealing, specifically the way of Ge-stell’s unconcealment.
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Heidegger gives the name Bestand to that which is ordered within the realm of Ge-stell’s
unconcealment.98 The systematized procedure of unlocking, disclosing, transforming, storing-up,
and switching-over, exhibit that “everywhere [what is summoned] is ordered (bestellt) to stand
(stehen) in place (zur Stelle) at its place (auf der Stelle), and indeed to stand so as itself to be
orderable (bestellbar) for a further ordering (Bestellen).” Heidegger’s example of coal illustrates
the ordered (Bestellte) as standing in place to be ordered furthered; coal stands in place in order
for it to accumulate heat, and the said heat will eventually be ordered to produce steam, which will
be ordered to keep the factory running. Although “the ordered has its own stand (Stand),” (and is
therefore called Bestand) does not necessarily mean that Bestand is self-standing. 99 From the
perspective of Bestand, the ordered is not self-standing because “it has its stand only from out of
the ordering (Bestellen) of the orderable (Bestellbar).”100 It does not order itself, it “stands” in only
to be ordered, and in the realm of Ge-stell, the orderable has no agency— we must not forget that
this is a tyranny of means and ends.
If Bestand does not order itself, then who carries out the ordering?: “Who accomplishes
the summoning putting-upon, through which what one names the actual (Wirkliche) is unconcealed
as Bestand?”101 Heidegger resolves the question positing that is it man. It may seem obvious that
the human is the one who carries out the ordering of Bestand, the human has, after all, taken it
upon themselves to occupy the role as master and cause efficiens. The human realizes the ordering
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of Ge-stell, but not because the human is ‘master’— “modern technique as ordering (bestellend)
unconcealing is no mere human doing.”102 Rather the human plays an essential role in the ordering
unconcealing because the human is summoned by Ge-stell to order Bestand; “only insofar as [the
human] is already summoned to further the energies of nature, can this ordering (bestellende)
unconcealing happen.”103 Although the unconcealing of Ge-stell appears reliant on the human
being’s to order “the actual as Bestand,” it is important to reiterate that this unconcealing is not a
human doing.104 Heidegger asks: “does this unconcealing happen somewhere beyond all human
doing? No. Still it does not happen only in man, nor in a measure-giving way through him.”105
Not only is Ge-stell a setting and putting into place that summons nature and material
beings to be ordered, further ordered, and unconcealed as Bestand, Ge-stell also summons the
human being to order: “Gestell is the gathering of this putting (Stellen) that puts (stellt), i.e.
summons man to unconceal the actual in the way of ordering (Bestellen) as Bestand.”106 In such a
way, the human being is summoned to stand within the realm of Ge-stell. Now, we have come to
an understanding of Ge-stell—the Wesen of modern technique—that is far more precise. Ge-stell
is a kind of unconcealing that unfolds within the Wesen of modern technique, yet “Ge-stell is
nothing technical, nothing machine-like. It is the way in which the actual unconceals itself as
Bestand,”107 and in Ge-stell’s domain, all beings come to relate as Bestand.

102

Ibid, 15; [19].
Ibid, 14; [17].
104
Ibid, 15; [19].
105
Ibid, 19; [23].
106
Ibid, 16; [20].
107
Ibid, 19; [23].
103

47
Ge-stell’s Domination
As the Wesen of modern technique, “Ge-stell brings man on the way of that unconcealing
through which everywhere, more or less perceptibly, the actual becomes Bestand.”108 In “What is
Ge-stell?” we developed this happening, with the exception of one component: the bringing on a
way. This ability of Ge-stell, to bring the human on a way, is critical in our grasp of Ge-stell. It is
Ge-stell’s bringing on a way, its sending, that characterizes it as a destiny: “bringing on a way, we
call: sending (schicken). We name the gathering of the sending that brings man on a way of
unconcealing: destiny (das Geschick).” 109 In the German word for destiny, Geschick, we hear
sending, schicken; and as a destiny, Ge-stell sends the human being into its domain, in which all
is unconcealed as Bestand. In other words, “as the summoning into ordering (Bestellen), Ge-stell
destines into a way of unconcealing.” Ge-stell has come to dominate in the modern age, becoming
the destiny of unconcealment, which is to say that Ge-stell is the exclusive way of unconcealing.
What is at stake in Ge-stell’s domination is homelessness insofar as the human being relates to all
beings as Bestand. In this purely ‘teleological’ relation, the human being loses sight of the
immanent web of Being they belong to. No longer does the human being, Dasein, dwell in the
house of Being. Die Lichtung is entirely closed up by the unconcealment of modern technique, in
which Ge-stell reigns and all becomes Bestand. Because Being is unable to be mastered, we
abandon it, living in the oblivion of truth that is the domination of Ge-stell’s destiny.
How does the exclusivity of Ge-stell as the destiny of unconcealment ensue? It begins with
the summoning call of Ge-stell. The human is summoned by Ge-stell, and as a destiny of
unconcealment, Ge-stell brings the human into its domain: “[destiny] brings man at any time on a
way of unconcealing, man goes, thus on the way, always forward to the edge of the possibility of
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pursuing and carrying on only what is unconcealed in ordering (Bestellen), and of taking all
measures from there.”110 Brought on a way into the realm of Ge-stell, the human being carries out
the ordering of Ge-stell—not because the human being is servile to Ge-stell, but because the human
belongs to the destiny of unconcealment. And since the human measures all from the unconcealed,
“the other possibility closes itself up: That man lets himself sooner and more and steadily more
incipiently into the essence of the unconcealed and into the unconcealedness of the unconcealed,
so as to experience as his essence the needed belonging to unconcealment.”111 The embrace of Gestell’s unconcealing destiny comes easily to the human. Mainly because unconcealment is where
the human being finds freedom, “for man becomes free precisely insofar as he belongs in the
domain of destiny.”112 We may visualize the realm of unconcealment as die Lichtung of Being,
where both the truth of Being and the human being’s Wesen lie. Because this destinal domain of
unconcealment is exclusively one of Ge-stell—in which all becomes ordered as Bestand—all other
possibilities of unconcealing close up when the human fully embraces the Geschick of Ge-stell.
Closed off from the other possibilities of unconcealment, “man is imperiled from out of
destiny.” 113 But “the destiny of unconcealment is as such in each of its ways and therefore
necessarily peril,” meaning that all unconcealing holds within it the possibility of peril. 114
Particularly, “the peril that man goes astray in the unconcealed and misunderstands it.”115 Tending
back to the four cause, we remember that indeed the bringing-forth of ποίησις was an unconcealing
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of responsibility and care. Technique was not always consumed by causa efficiens, once causa
efficiens was only one part of a four-part unconcealing, but somehow the intoxicating obsession
with cause and effect took hold. It is no coincidence that this similarly unfolded within the demise
of “philosophy” in the last chapter. Insofar as metaphysics and humanism became solely concerned
with the mere fulfilment of valuable ends such as correctness of gaze and scientific merit,
subsequently leading to a withdrawal of Being and truth (ἀλήθεια).
The decisive turn is that although the risk of going astray is always present, for “the destiny
of unconcealment is in itself not some one peril, but the peril,” there is greater peril in the swaying
of destiny toward Ge-stell.116 Heidegger suggests that the peril of Ge-stell, which is the highest
peril, manifests in two respects: 1. the human being is taken only as Bestand and 2. the human
being deceptively assumes the position as master of beings and Being. The former manifests itself
when the unconcealed approaches the human being exclusively as Bestand, placing the human
“within objectlessness (das Gegenstandlose) only still the orderer (Besteller) of Bestand, — man
goes to the outermost edge of the precipice, namely where he himself is to be taken as only still
Bestand.” 117 The latter aspect of peril arises when the same human that is so threatened by
Bestand’s hold, “props [themselves] up in the Gestalt of lord of the earth. Thus, the semblance
spreads that all one encounters, stands (bestehe) only insofar as it is a product of man's making.
This semblance produces in time a last deceptive semblance.”118 The human equates themselves
as ‘lord of the earth’ and places all that has been ordered as Bestand under their agency as so ‘lord.’
But this is a falsity, and it furthers the drive toward all being ordered as Bestand, misunderstood
as mere means.
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This peril produces the false assumption that everywhere the human encounters
themselves, “meanwhile contemporary man in truth precisely no longer encounters himself, i.e.
his essence, anywhere.”119 The human being becomes homeless, this is not a question of when the
human encounters themselves, it is a matter that the human no longer ever encounters themselves:
Man stands so decisively in the following of the summoning of Ge-stell, that he does not
perceive the latter as a claim, that he overlooks himself as the one who is claimed, and
thereby in every way also overhears how far, from out of his own essence, he ek-sists (eksistiert) in the domain of an address and therefore can never encounter only himself.120

The ability to recognize the summoning call of Ge-stell for what it is, is entirely suspended. This
peril is autopoietic, it reproduces itself in the mere nature of Ge-stell’s unconcealing. For one it
summons the human to order all as Bestand, but eventually the human goes astray in the weeds of
Bestand and objectlessness. So far astray has the human gone, that this summoning call has been
forgotten, the human abstracts themselves as ‘lord of the earth’ and all ordering is misunderstood
to be under human mandate. This viscous cycle drives the human being away from their essence,
and far removed from the house of Being, the human being becomes homeless.
The ramifications of Ge-stell extend further than imperiling the human’s relation to
themselves and to the actual. Ge-stell relentlessly orders, thus, “as destiny it points into
unconcealing in the manner of ordering (Bestellen).”121 By attempting to order the unconcealment
itself, Ge-stell dispels all other prospects of unconcealment, but most importantly, “Ge-stell
conceals that unconcealing which lets what is present come-forth in appearance in the sense of
ποίησις.”122 In concealing ποίησις, Ge-stell is not only concealing a former mode of unconcealing,
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Ge-stell is also concealing ἀλήθεια. By concealing unconcealing (ἀλήθεια), “Ge-stell misplaces
(verstellt) the shining and swaying of truth. The destiny that destines into ordering (Bestellen), is
therewith the outermost peril.”123 Although Ge-stell—as a destiny of unconcealing and modern
technique’s essence— is the highest peril, Heidegger emphasizes that “imperiling is not technique”
and “the transformed signification of the word ‘Ge-stell’ becomes perhaps a little more familiar to
us when we think Ge-stell in the sense of destiny (Geschick) and peril (Gefahr).” 124

The Possibility of an Alternative Destiny
The extremity of Ge-stell as the Geschick of Being makes the danger of technique manifest,
concealing unconcealing as such. Yet somehow within technique’s peril opens the possibility of
another way of relating to Being, or an alternative destiny of Being. Heidegger refers to this
alternative destiny as “the save.” Heidegger’s language of the save within the peril is borrowed
explicitly from the words of the late poet Hölderlin,125 which Heidegger quotes as follows: ‘“But
where peril is, grows/ What saves also.”’126 In this section, we will seek out this alternative destiny
that Heidegger refers to as the save, opening up the possibilities that were previously closed off by
Ge-stell.
When Heidegger writes that “the destiny of unconcealment always sways man through and
through,” 127 he does not mean that the human becomes servile to destiny. Instead, the human
listens and hears (hören) the destiny of unconcealment; in this hearing, the human being becomes
“obedient” (hörender) to destiny.128 The significance of the word “obedience” in this occasion is
123
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lost in translation, for Heidegger is playing with the shared etymology of “to hear,” hören, and “to
be obedient,” hörender. The obedience of the human in the sway of destiny’s unconcealment, can
be clarified by a return to the idea of “summoning.” The human is summoned and called by the
destiny of unconcealment (which in modern age, is the call of Ge-stell), insofar as we listen, we
become free. The Wesen of freedom for Heidegger is “not primordially bound to the will, nor
indeed to the causality of human willing.” 129 Freedom rather holds an intimate standing with
unconcealing of truth:
All unconcealing comes out of the free (das Freie), goes into the free, and brings into the
free. The freedom of the free (das Freie) consists neither in the unboundness of the will to
choose (Willkür), nor in the binding of mere laws (Gesetze)…Freedom is the domain of
the destiny that at any time brings unconcealment on its way.130

All destinal unconcealment is freeing, for freedom is a fundamental part of unconcealment. This
means that even the unconcealing of Ge-stell comes out of and goes into the free (das Freie).
Heidegger is putting forth an idea of freedom that is vastly different than the accomplishing human
choice or will: freedom is a realm, freedom is die Lichtung.
There is radical potential that lies in the freedom of unconcealment. Heidegger states, “the
essence of modern technique rests in Ge-stell. The latter belongs in the destiny of unconcealment,”
and “these sentences (Sätze) say something other than the often sounding talk that technique is the
fate (Schicksal) of our age, wherein fate means: the unavoidability of an unalterable course.”131
Destiny is not a fixed fatalistic doom, as unconcealment it belongs to the free and thus is malleable,
even when under the dominion of Ge-stell. But how may we experience the freedom that lies in
technique?
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Heidegger says that simply in thinking about Ge-stell, we undergo Ge-stell as an
unconcealing destiny. In this reflective experience, “we already dwell within the free (das Freie)
of destiny…when we open ourselves properly to the essence of technique, we find ourselves
unexpectedly under a claim that frees.”132 By thoughtfully acknowledging Ge-stell as that which
summons us, we don’t fall into the deceptive trap of Ge-stell’s peril that veils its summoning call
as something outside of ourselves and not of our own doing. We recognize the call as something
that belongs to technique’s destiny, a destiny that we too belong to. This open dwelling “in no way
shuts us into a dull compulsion blindly to carry on with technique, or, what is the same, helplessly
to rebel against it and to condemn it as devil's work.”133 For Heidegger, freedom is found not
through fighting nor blind submission; it is found in unconcealing and can be properly restored by
way of the save.
We know that Heidegger’s idea of the save is delivered from Hölderlin’s hymn, “Patmos,”
(i.e., “But where peril is, grows/ What saves also.”) but beyond a referential significance, what
exactly does “the save” signify? Heidegger expounds upon this question for us, writing that ‘“to
save’ is: to pull something back into its essence, so as first to bring that essence to its proper
shining.”134 We recall that truth for the Greeks, in the sense of ἀλήθεια, is a shining. Therefore, “if
the essence of technique, Ge-stell, is the outermost peril, and if at the same time Hölderlin's word
says the truth, then the domination of Ge-stell cannot exhaust itself in misplacing (verstellen) all
lighting of every unconcealing, all shining of truth.” 135 Ge-stell as the outermost peril is an
unconcealing, and although it may conceal the unconcealing of ἀλήθεια as such, is incapable of
stifling every blitz of shining truth. The implications of this are great, for then “the essence of
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technique must rather harbor (bergen) in itself the growth of what saves.”136 Although Ge-stell is
extreme in its reign, and the possibility of a save within the peril appears to be paradoxical, we
must keep in mind that these happenings are not opposing forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ Value
gradation is precisely what Heidegger is resisting in his thinking, for valuing inevitably becomes
type of ordering. To simplify into polarized categories would be not only a grave mistake but also
a repetition of past error. Rather these happenings are unfolding as entangled ways of Being, out
of the destiny of ἀλήθεια comes ποίησις, the four causes, and technique; out of which consequently
arises the essence of modern technique, Ge-stell, which is the highest peril; but within this peril
lies what can traverse us through it, out of it, and into the saving.
Before delving into the saving, I want to briefly turn back toward homelessness. After all,
we began our inquiry of technique to deepen our understanding of homelessness. Thus, the saving
is not just a possible save from Ge-stell’s dominion, it is also a save from the destiny of
homelessness that bound with domination of modern technique’s Wesen. Visually, I conceptualize
the genesis of homelessness like a tree. The branches are the various ideological causes that lead
homelessness: including but not limited to, humanism, metaphysics, scientific positivism. And the
fruits represent these ideologies’ knowledge production: correctness of gaze as “truth, praxis,
dogmatic “logic” and value, et cetera. Prolifically reaching, these branches and their fruits twist at
some moments and part ways at others, extending out into manifold directions; but no matter the
distance deviated from one another, they originate from a single trunk. I posit the trunk as
technique because lodged within technique is the so called ‘telos’ of means to an end. Out of
technique, the will to master emerges. But technique, even in its reign of Ge-stell remains a mode
of unconcealment. Therefore, the roots of this tree are ἀλήθεια, and this is why both homelessness
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and Ge-stell are destinies of unconcealment; because they are both parts of the same tree, rooted
in ἀλήθεια. For, “where something grows, there it roots, from there it thrives. Both happen
concealed and still and in their time.”137 The peril of Ge-stell’s domination, and subsequently
homelessness, as the exclusive destiny of unconcealing is entrenched in ἀλήθεια. And insofar as
Ge-stell is modern technique’s Wesen, we must return again to the question of technique, asking
after its meaning once more.
Technique as a signifier may be traced back to the Greek word τεχνικός, meaning “what
belongs to τέχνη.”138 Curiously enough, τέχνη (techne) is the name assigned to both handworkly
craft as well as the fine arts; thus, τέχνη is poetic, as it dwells in the bringing-forth and making of
ποίησις. Heidegger asserts that “once not only technique bore the name τέχνη. Once τέχνη was
also that unconcealing that brings-forth truth in the splendor of what shines. Once τέχνη was also
the bringing-forth of the true in the beautiful (das Schöne).” 139 Somewhere along the way,
technique was not properly heard, and so Ge-stell assumed the domain of technique’s
unconcealment, τέχνη and ποίησις long ignored and forgotten. But when we actually hear
technique, and when we really listen, we hear τέχνη, which means that we hear ποίησις. In this
way, the save is in the peril.
Precisely out of and within Ge-stell, as the Wesen of technique, emerges the possibility of
what saves:
Hence all depends on whether we give thought to this emergence and guard it thoughtfully.
How does that happen? Above all in this way, that we look at the Wesende140 of technique,
instead of staring at the technical. As long as we represent (vorstellen) technique as
instrument, we remain hanging on to the will to master it. We drive past the essence of
technique.141
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Attentiveness is essential, being thoughtful is a kind of care, out of which we find the glimmer of
truth shine forth. We must go beyond the semblances of mere appearance, past the instrumental
manifestations of technique and into technique’s essence. By fixating solely on ‘technique as
instrument’ we reproduce the will of mastery, and never unconceal the concealment; “however, if
we ask how the instrumental west as a kind of causality, then we experience this Wesende as the
destiny of an unconcealing.” 142 Thus, the thoughtfulness of the human being is part of this
unconcealing. Because of this, “we are called upon to hope in the growing light of what saves.”143
How is it that we may bask in the glow of the saving? “Here and now and in small ways, so that
we guard the saving in its growth. This includes that at all times we keep looking into the outermost
peril.”144 To guard the saving in its growth depends on our attentiveness to the peril, only then can
we hear its call and see its light.
Human action alone can most certainly never stave off or obliterate the peril of Ge-stell
that threatens all unconcealing to be ordered as Bestand; “but human deliberation can give thought
to this, that what saves must be of a higher essence than, but at the same time akin to the
imperiled.”145 It is in deliberate thinking and careful listening that we hear ποίησις as the save from
the peril.
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III. Saving
In the unconcealment of Being, chronology is not linear. Being does not subscribe to the
limited human time scale we operate within no matter how adamantly we attempt to impose human
dimensionality onto Being. Because of the nonhuman time scale of Being, Being’s unconcealment
should not be thought of in terms of sequential stages.
Both homelessness and Ge-stell are ways in which Being perilously unconceals itself. But
insofar as Being is outside of human temporal schema, it is not a question of whether homelessness
happens before Ge-stell’s domination or vice versa. Homelessness may very well happen as a part
of Ge-stell’s reign, just as Ge-stell might unfold within homelessness. Therefore, although
homelessness and Ge-stell stand on their own as particular destinies of Being, in no way are the
two mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, Ge-stell and homelessness point to nuanced aspects of
the same unconcealment of Being.
Despite this vast share between homelessness and Ge-stell—as both signify the perilous
ways in which Being destines its unconcealment—their particularities are essential to deepening
our insight into the perilous state of Being we have arrived to. A state in which the will to mastery
has covered up Being whilst decaying the dwelling place of Dasein, and we saw the examples of
such a decay in the manifestations of modern technique approaching all beings as mere means to
ends. The precise differences between homelessness and Ge-stell lies in the particular
manifestation they point to within Being’s unconcealing destiny. Peering into homelessness and
Ge-stell’s respective particularities illuminates the multiplexity of the peril, giving way to a wellrounded portrait of the decayed world that becomes when the human being only posits themselves
as master. When there is nothing that is not seen as the doing of the human being, a world fully of
the human’s making with no escape. A world in which language declines and meaning becomes
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veiled by the will to will: nothing matters except whatever will the human being sets for
themselves. The particular manifestations of homelessness and Ge-stell can deepen our
understanding of how a save may grow from this perilous situation the world has found itself in.
Homelessness in its particularity can be traced back to ‘language as the house of Being.’
In the first chapter, we investigated Heidegger’s positing of this linguistic home, in which the
human being, Dasein,146 essentially dwells. As the dweller of the house of Being, Dasein must
care after this house, as the shepherd of Being. By thinking toward Being as distinct from beings,
Dasein is affecting care. This thoughtfulness is also how Dasein, as the one who belongs to Being,
ek-statically sustains die Lichtung (clearing of Being). This thoughtful sustaining is not entirely an
act of “selfless” care, as it benefits Dasein insofar as it attends to Dasein’s essence. But it most
certainly is not an act of selfish mastery either. In caring after Being, the will to self-assertion is
absent; for the human being does not stand against Being but rather with and in Being, thoughtfully
dwelling in language.147
The moment that the human being attempts to place their standing outside and against
Being, they no longer dwell in the house of Being. In such a way, the human being becomes
homeless. Homelessness thus points to a moment of Being’s destiny that severs the relationship
between the Dasein and Being; which is to say the relationship between language, thinking, and
Being. As a destiny of thoughtlessness, language is taken over by both meaningless chatter and
pretentious jargon, becoming a “tool” of utility and mastery. Language in its essential closeness to
Being— not as high speech or simple communication— but as revelation of being, is forgotten.
The house of Being falls apart, leaving Dasein homeless. Homelessness is a perilous phase of
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Being’s unconcealing destiny in which the Being is forgotten by the human being, the
unconcealing is concealed by forgetfulness.
Ge-stell’s domination unfolds as another moment of Being’s perilous unconcealing. The
particularity of Ge-stell is, like homelessness, bound up with the will to master. But Ge-stell’s
mastery is more specific in how it masters. Ge-stell, as the Wesen of modern technique places the
human being in a position in which they relate to all beings as Bestand. In other words, under the
reign of Ge-stell all beings lose their particular stands and become mere standing-in-reserve. They
become solely means to an end— and the end for Ge-stell is stand-less ordering, to the extent that
Being’s unconcealing itself is seen as a thing to be ordered.
As perilous aspects of a common destiny, Ge-stell and homelessness inform one another.
At first it may seem that the human being plays a corresponding role in the shaping of destiny.
Eventually it becomes apparent that in actually the human being is not an informant but is rather
informed; as Ge-stell and homelessness alienate Dasein from Dasein’s Wesen. Dasein
subsequently loses their linguistic home and free standing within the openness of Being. Yet even
as Dasein’s Wesen is alienated from Dasein, Dasein remains Da-Sein— which is to say that Dasein
continues to belong to Being. And no matter how forgotten Being has become, how far down
Being is buried in concealment, it remains as what West: Being prevails as Being. I don’t think it
is possible for the human being to ever depart from Being; to the extent that the human being is a
being, they belong to Being. So even as the human being in the peril falls away from Being and
out of conscious dwelling, there is always potential for the save.
In this chapter the save will be the primary point of inquiry. In the first section I will address
the precise role of the human being in overcoming the peril and re-interrogate the peril as the site
of saving. Although we touched upon the ways in which the save grows from the peril in the
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previous chapter, in this chapter we will deepen and clarify this by digging further into the
“Question Concerning Technique.”
The site of the save and the role of the human in the saving go hand in hand. The human
being plays a crucial role in overcoming the peril, of course not as lord of Being nor as the single
most powerful agent of change. Rather in Dasein’s ability to care for, think toward, and belong to
Being. As already stated, Dasein belongs to Being, and Being is housed in language, thus the
human being is a linguistic being. Not in the manner of zoon echon logon as “animal rationale,”
for the human being does not possess language as a mere tool to further ends, rather the human
being dwells in language. But the human being does not dwell in language just any way. Heidegger
writes: “the same poet, [i.e., Hölderlin] from whom we heard the words ‘But where peril is, grows/
What saves also.’ tells us: ‘. . . poetically dwells man on this earth.’”148 The human being dwells
poetically.
It is only from its poetic essence that the save holds such radical potential for bringingforth restoration of the relation between Dasein and dwelling. The dwelling of the human being is
a poetic dwelling, and so it is fitting that the save from the peril is a poetic save. Furthermore, as
homelessness tells us the peril is in part a linguistic degradation. As the primordial language of
being, as opposed to debased understanding of language as solely a means to an end, poetry in its
essence bring-forth language in its proper light. That the save grows out of the peril is imperative
to understanding the essence of the saving as poetics.
The remainder of the chapter will tend to the poetic save giving way for the human being
to once again ek-statically sustain die Lichtung. I will focus specifically on “…Poetically Man
Dwells…” (“…dichterisch wohnet der Mensch…”), which was, on “Heidegger’s account: ‘[a]
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lecture, given on October 6th, 1951, at Blüherhöhe,’ printed in the first number of Akzente,
Zeitschrift für Diuchtung.”149 I will also turn to a number of essays that accompany “…Poetically
Man Dwells…” in the collection of Heidegger’s essays titled Poetry, Language, Thought. By
working between these texts, we will establish what Heidegger means by “poetry” within this
poetic dwelling. Which of course means that we must address what he also means by “dwelling”
and how exactly human being “dwells poetically.”
The peril deceives the human being into believing they are master, when in fact they will
not and cannot ever master Being. In actuality the peril masters all beings (human and nonhuman
beings alike). The peril makes manifest its power over the human being by placing Dasein out of
its dwelling and into the undignified orderability of Bestand. Poetics, as the saving, goes through
the peril and effectively draws Dasein back into die Lichtung and house of Being, i.e., language.

Overcoming the Peril
When Heidegger writes about the peril, he is specifically speaking about Ge-stell. I have
taken it upon myself to expand the meaning of the peril to include homelessness. I find this
expansion justifiable because homelessness is quite frankly a perilous destiny of unconcealment.
Homelessness is perilous for reasons we have posited countless times: it comes out of a will to
mastery and furthers this masterful will in its unfolding. And as I posited above, homelessness and
Ge-stell are in many ways a shared phenomenom. But because Heidegger writes precisely about
the peril in terms of Ge-stell in the “Question Concerning Technique,” the following textual
analysis will be thinking along the lines of Ge-stell. When it comes time for interpretation, I will
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weave into question homelessness. For me, the interplay of the two crucial because I am interested
in a saving from not only the dominion of Ge-stell, but the problem of homelessness too.
To reorient ourselves lets work our way back into the “Question Concerning Technique”
and the problematic interiority of Ge-stell. Ge-stell is so committed to ordering that it misplaces
its own essence, Stellen, into the orderable: “the essence of Gestell is the putting (Stellen), gathered
in itself, that traps (nachstellt) the truth of its own essence in forgottenness.” 150 Ge-stell, in
forgetting its own essence to the tyranny of Bestand, begins to order itself as Bestand. The
entrapped truth of Ge-stell’s essence “misplaces itself (sich verstellt), in that it unfolds itself into
ordering (Bestellen) as Bestand all that is present, erects itself in Bestand, and dominates as
Bestand.”151 I read ‘misplacing’ (Vorstellung) as key move in understanding what exactly how the
peril unfolds itself. The peril is both Ge-stell and Being. The peril is Being itself because Ge-stell
is a particular way in which Being unconceals itself, Ge-stell is a way that Being makes itself
manifest to us under the reign of modern technique and the will to mastery. Ge-stell not only
misplaces its own Wesen, namely Stellen, but also misplaces the truth of Being’s Wesen. This
misplacing is how the peril unfolds itself in the most perilous sense. Heidegger expresses this in
the following passage:
Gestell west as the peril. But does the peril therewith already announce itself as the peril?
No. Perils and needs oppress man exceedingly everywhere at every hour. But the peril,
namely being itself (das Sein selbst) imperiling itself in the truth of its essence, remains
covered and misplaced (verstellt). This misplacing (Verstellung) is what imperils most in
the peril. In accordance with this misplacing (Verstellung) of the peril through the ordering
(Bestellen) of Gestell, it always still and always again seems as though technique were a
means in man's hand. But in truth the essence of man is now ordered (bestellt) to give a
hand to the essence of technique.152
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The peril, which is not Being in its true essence but rather Being as “unconcealed” to us in its
concealment (i.e., concealed by the ordering of Bestand), also lead the human being to a misplaced
understanding of agency. The human being is led to believe that they hold technique in their hand,
when in actuality they are oppressed by the peril. The human being in their oppressed and
undignified state of being put into place as Bestand, as an orderable means to the end of Ge-stell,
is actually giving assistance to the perilous unconcealment as such. This news, although
disheartening, is not entirely bleak; for it means that the human being is a potential actor of change.
Again, I tirelessly reiterate that the human being cannot assist in transformation of the peril
as ‘master.’ If the peril is Being itself, then it can’t simply be overcome by the human being “if
this were so, [the human] would be the lord of being (des Seins).”153 We know very well that the
human being is not the lord of Being but is the shepherd. Insofar as “the essence of technique,
Gestell as the peril in being (im Sein), is being itself (das Sein selbst), then technique will never
let itself be mastered by a human doing, positive or negative, merely posed on itself (auf sich
gestellt).”154 The human being indeed has a role in overcoming Ge-stell’s destiny, but only insofar
as the human being is Being’s caring shepherd, and not a misguided authority figure.
That the human being is the shepherd of Being, an idea that we introduced in the first
chapter, is of the utmost importance. Within Heidegger’s conception of shepherding is the
sentiment of belonging. The human being, in their true essence, belongs to Being. But this
belonging is dynamic insofar as it is not merely a passive ‘I belong to’ but an active ‘I belong to
and thus care after my belonging.’ Dasein and Being share a spirited relationship, sustained by
thinking and dwelling. At the same time, Being has “destined itself in Gestell as the essence of
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technique.”155 This destining does not negate the belonging of Dasein to Sein. Instead it means
that “the essence of technique cannot be led into the transformation of its destiny without the help
of the essence of man.”156 The caring shepherding of Sein by Dasein is needed in the face of
careless mastery.
Heidegger addresses this need of the human being, asserting that the way in which the
human being will be needed is in the “corresponding of [their] essence to this getting-over.”157
Because the human being belongs to Being, they also belong to Ge-stell as a way of Being’s
unconcealment. Thus, the human being cannot simply dissent against Ge-stell, for that would
create only more internal dissonance and no “getting-over,” as Heidegger calls the overcoming of
the peril. To avoid further strife and think toward possible savings, “the essence of man must first
open itself to the essence of technique, which as an Ereignis is something wholly other than the
going forward of man affirming and furthering technique and its means.”158 To open up is neither
an acceptance of Ge-stell’s mastery or fateful defeat; it is a correspondence. Only by first opening
up to the peril can the human being acknowledge the peril’s existence as something it stands
within, recognizing that no longer are they essentially dwelling in the house of Being, but are
homeless and severed from their essence. To a certain extent this Ereignis is metaphorically
comparable to the first step of AA— admittance, acknowledgement, a recognition of
powerlessness in order to get-over this powerlessness. But Heidegger writes that before this
recognition can happen, before “an essential relation to found itself between technique and man
with respect to the essence of technique, modern man must first of all beforehand find the way
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back to the breadth of his essential space.”159 In the demand that the human being must first find a
way back to their essential space before overcoming the peril, we hear a resonance to the “Letter
on Humanism.” In the letter, we are told that “if the human being is to find his way once again into
the nearness of being he must first learn to exist in the nameless.”160 In other words, before the
human being can overcome homelessness and once again dwell ek-statically in die Lichtung,
returning to the house of Being, the human must learn to exist in the nameless. I interpret the
“nameless” as another way of saying “essential breadth.” In order to get-over the peril of both Gestell and homelessness the human being must find a way out of the chatter and mastery and into a
more primordial realm of existence.
Heidegger always seems to be looking for a “way” (Weg); a way through, across, into,
towards, et cetera— but to my knowledge never a way around. I understand the finding of a way
as thinking. For Heidegger, thinking carves a path through the thick of existence and on the way
towards Being. Thinking is the way for the human being. But thinking must go into and think
through the peril. In part, this is why the save lies in the peril. Thinking cannot merely go around,
the peril and into the saving, because it is only out of the perilous destiny of Being that a way can
be can be found back into Being’s truth. In fact, it is precisely in thinking that the truth of Being
opens itself to us once again:
In the face of the essential homelessness of human beings, the approaching destiny of the
human being reveals itself to thought on the history of [Being] in this, that the human being
find his way into the truth of [Being] and set out on this find.161

In thinking, the truth of Ge-stell’s unfolding unveils itself to us; we see that we are in fact not the
lord of beings and Being, but ourselves under Ge-stell’s domination. This thoughtful recognition
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opens ourselves up to the danger that we must go through to get to the saving, thus this revelation
is a prerequisite to finding our way back into the truth of Being.
Heidegger makes the necessity of thinking explicitly clear: “therefore what is needed first
is this, that beforehand we give thought to the essence of being (des Seins) as what is worthy-ofthought, that beforehand, so thinking, we experience how far we are called first to trace a path for
such experience and to open it in what has so long been impassable.”162 But to think about the
essence of Being, is also to think about language. For “language is the incipient dimension within
which the essence of man is first capable at all of corresponding to being (dem Sein) and to the
claim of being, and in this corresponding to belong to being (dem Sein).”163 Language as the house
of Being and the abode of Dasein’s true essence, is the realm in which this budding correspondence
between Dasein and Sein may emerge. And “this incipient corresponding, properly carried out, is
thinking. In thinking we first learn to inhabit the domain in which getting-over the destiny of being
(des Seinsgeschickes), getting-over Gestell, sich ereignet.”164 Therefore, the role of the human
being in the getting-over of the peril is thinking-correspondence. Thinking is correspondence, and
correspondence is opening oneself back up to Being. This opening up may be thought of in two
ways: 1. Recognition of the peril as the peril, 2. Thinking toward Being in its true essence.
Thinking is imperative, not only in the issue of the peril at hand, but in the experience of
the human being, for “as long as we do not thoughtfully experience what is, we can never belong
to what will be.”165 Simply experiencing alienation from Being under the reign of the will to
mastery is not enough, it will not bring about a saving. A saving arises only if Dasein carefully
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meditates on this experience and acknowledges that it is a destiny not extraneous to their existence;
they too belong to the perilous destiny of the modern age. Belonging to the peril means that they
too can belong to the save in that the save is situated within the peril.
We have reiterated that ‘where the peril grows also grows what saves,’ “but where is the
peril? What is the site (Ort) for it?”166 The peril does not West as a specific site, “insofar as the
peril is being itself (das Sein selber), it is nowhere and everywhere. It has no site as something
other than it itself. It is itself the siteless space (ortlose Ortschaft) of all presence. The peril is the
epoch of being (des Seins), wesend as Gestell.” 167 Heidegger posits that the peril cannot be
articulated as a set of coordinates, its site is the site of Being’s unconcealment which unfolds
everywhere. To this point I want to push back against Heidegger. I agree that Being unconceals in
every corner of the world, for Being is multidimensional and thus exceeds boundaries constructed
and policed by the human being. Yet I would argue that Heidegger only really considers what we
refer to as the “West” in his thinking. How indigenous communities think about Being is inherently
different, and arguably more in correspondence with Being’s truth. Nonetheless, the will to
mastery is inflicted upon these communities whether or not they are the individuals willing power
in the Western sense of the word. Thus, most are subjected to this encroaching will to mastery that
seems devoted to permeating every crevice of the world, even if they are not on board with it. Only
under this rational do I agree that Being’s unconcealment unfolds everywhere as the peril, keeping
in mind that there are many ways in which Being destines itself into unconcealing.
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We have thoroughly addressed the ‘where’ of the peril (as both everywhere and nowhere)
and the ‘what’ of peril (as Ge-stell and homelessness), but we have yet to properly address the
‘how’ of the peril as the save:
The peril itself is, when it is as the peril, what saves. The peril is what saves, insofar as out
of its concealed turning essence it brings what saves. What is it “to save” (retten)? It says:
To release, to make free, to free, to spare, to shelter (bergen), to take under protection, to
keep-in-trust (wahren).168

Seemingly paradoxically, the peril actually becomes what saves, sets free, protects, and ‘keeps-intrust. What is this ‘keeping-in-trust’ that Heidegger speaks of? Heidegger’s specific language of
the ‘keeping-in-trust’ as the turning from the peril into the save (die Rettung) can be traced back
to Lessing. Heidegger writes that “Lessing still uses the word ‘Rettung’ in an emphatic way in the
sense of justification (Rechtfertigung): to set back (zurückstellen), to keep in the right, in the
essential. What properly saves is what keeps-in-trust, the keeping-in-trust (das Wahrende, die
Wahrnis).”169 The keeping-in-trust is a grace that dwells in the Wesen of peril, “namely the grace
of the turn of the forgottenness of being (des Seins) into the truth of being (des Seins).”170 The
keeping-in-trust is the swift move from perilous unconcealment into the save. But the turn from
“the forgottenness of being (des Seins) to the keeping-in-trust of the essence of being (des Seins),
ereignet sich only if the turning peril in the hidden essence of forgottenness first once properly
comes to light as the peril that it is.”171 To a certain extent the save is a remembrance of Being’s
true essence, but only insofar as Being’s true essence is acknowledged by Dasein as being
forgotten under Ge-stell’s perilous reign.
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The turn lies in more than an acknowledgement of forgetting, the forgottenness of Being’s
Wesen actually turns itself into the keeping-in-trust. Heidegger outlines this as follows: “the selfdenial of the truth of being (des Seins) that traps itself (sich nachstellend) in forgottenness harbors
the still ungranted grace that this self-entrapment (Sichnachstellen) turns itself, that in such a turn
the forgottenness turns itself and becomes the keeping-in-trust of the essence of being (des
Seins).”172 Furthermore, this ungranted grace is granted only by Being; for “Being (Sein) does not
ever run in a causal nexus of effects…Being itself (das Sein selber) sends itself” into the saving.”173
And only in Being’s own time does Being swiftly unconceals itself. This development from
forgottenness into the saving of keeping-in-trust happens quite abruptly. Heidegger writes:
The turn of the peril ereignet sich suddenly. In the turn suddendly clears itself the clearing
of the essence of being (des Seins). This sudden self-clearing is the lightning-flash (das
Blitzen). It itself brings itself in its own brightness, which it brings-in with itself. When in
the turn of the peril, the truth of being (des Seins) flashes (blitzt), the essence of being clears
itself. Then the truth of the essence of being (des Seins) turns-in.174

Suddenly, the Wesen of Being in its truth reveals itself as a flash of light. The language of die
Lichtung resounds in this unfolding. Being clears itself as the clearing, die Lichtung; Being’s truth
shines forth out of truthlessness (Verwahrlosung) as a flash of light. Being lights itself as the grace,
Being’s Wesen ereignet sich from its own concealedness.175
Not long ago we examined the misplacement of Ge-stell as the highest peril insofar as Gestell misplaces both its own Wesen (i.e., Stellen), as well as the true Wesen of Being. Ge-stell’s
destining is so forgetful that it “even misplaces (verstellt) this its own misplacing (verstellen), just
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as the forgetting of something forgets itself and pulls itself away in the wake of forgottenness.”176
Yet somehow, in all this misplaced forgetting, “Ge-stell, clears itself the ray-of-light (Lichtblick)
of world, flashes the truth of being (des Seins).”177 Ge-stell as Being’s unconcealment becomes
what saves only after it “clears itself in its essence as the peril.”178 Considering there is no one
destiny of Being’s unconcealment, destiny is never to be understood in terms of a “fully ordained
doom”179 or fixed fate. “In Ge-stell as an essential destiny of being (des Seins), still west a light of
the lightning of being (des Seins),” there still glimmers a possibility of another way of
unconcealing. 180
But do we, in our thinking as Dasein, glance into the misplacement and “see the lightningflash of being (des Seins) in the essence of technique?”181 Heidegger asks: “do we correspond to
the glance through a look that looks into the essence of technique, and in this essence becomes
aware of being itself (das sein Selbst)?”182 To glance is to correspond, to “glance into what is, such
is the lightning of the truth (Wahrheit) of being (des Seins) in truthless being (in das wahrlose
Sein).”183 To glance into the unconcealment is to see das Blitzen of truth insofar as the Wesen of
“technique [clear’s] itself as Gestell… we recognize how, in the ordering (Bestellen) of Bestand,
the truth of being (des Seins) as world remains denied…we notice that all mere willing and doing
in the way of ordering (Bestellen) persists in truthlessness (Verwahrlosung).”184 To glance is to
‘thoughfully experience what is,’ opening ourselves up to the potential of what can and will be.
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It is in this thoughtful, corresponding glance out of our homeless, stand-less state and into
the peril of Being that the lighting-flash (das Blitzen) makes itself manifest to us. The lightingflash “comes out of stillness as stillness itself… What does it still? It stills [Being] (das Sein) in
the essence of world.”185 What does it mean to say that Being is still? Heidegger’s stillness is like
silence, it is the nameless that the human being must once again learn to dwell in and listen to.
When Heidegger writes that “Being is still waiting for the time when It itself will become thoughtprovoking to the human being,”186 we hear two things: 1. Being still remains anticipatory of the
human being’s thinking toward It, and 2. Being is still, it is silent, and in this stillness it awaits the
thoughtful listening of the human being. Those who hear Being ringing out of its silence, and see
Being in its true Wesen flash from the darkness that is its peril, are brought into the stillness of
Being in the world. And “so that world, worlding, be the nearest of all the near that nears, in that
it brings the truth of being (des Seins) nearer to the essence of man and so brings man to belong to
Ereignis.”187 In thinking and correspondence, Dasein opens themselves to the peril and is thus
drawn closer to the Wesen of Being.
In such a circumstance Being’s truth seems to be once again thought provoking to the
human being, “but if the truth of being has become thought-provoking for thinking, then reflection
on the essence of language must also attain a different rank.”188 In the homelessness peril, we know
that language as the house of Being is deteriorated by the language of utility and mastery.
Homelessness means that “language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of
being. Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of
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domination over beings.”189 If language continues to be thoughtlessly ignored in its true Wesen as
Being’s dwelling place, then we can never expect a save. For language must be restored to its true
Wesen if we hope to once again dwell in die Lichtung, ek-statically sustaining the relationship
between Being and language.
How can language be uplifted out of the destitution it has found itself in, within the
entrapment of the perilous unfolding of destiny? Poetry west as language in its true relation to
Being, thus the poetic restores language as the house of Being, in which the human being may
dwell. As the perilous “destiny that sends truth, being remains concealed. But the destiny of world
is heralded in poetry, without yet becoming manifest as the history of being.”190 Poetry carries
with it the Wesen of truth, it “brings the true in the brightness of what Plato names in Phaedrus τό
έκφανέστατον191 the most purely shining-forth.”192 Poetry is the messenger of Being’s truth, and
the poet carries out this message only insofar as the poet first hears the call of Being from its silent
ringing. We find ourselves again returning to the quote that says that “the same poet, from whom
we heard the word: ‘But where peril is, grows/What saves also.’ tells us: ‘. . . poetically dwells
man on this earth.’”193 From Hölderlin’s own poetic heralding, we hear that the dwelling of the
human being is a poetic dwelling. As a binging-forth, the poetic west through all unconcealment,
even that of the peril. Now we hear the saving as that which springs from the peril in a poetic light.
It is only timely that now we address the saving as a poetic save.
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The Venturesome Poet
In “Imperiled,” we peered into the innately bound relation between ποίησις (poiesis:
bringing-forth) and ἀλήθεια (aletheia: truth as unconcealedness). The inherent intimacy between
the two is because ποίησις only happens insofar as something is brought-forth out of concealment
into unconcealment; thus, ποίησις rests upon truth, i.e., ἀλήθεια. Now, I pose the question: what
is the ‘poetic’ within the framework of the saving? To attend to this question, we must recall
ποίησις in its originary meaning as posed by the Greeks. As we have already mapped out in our
investigation into τέχνη (techne), there are three particular ways that ποίησις materially manifests
itself: 1. Φύσις (physis: nature), 2. hand-workly making, 3. the arts. In our investigation of τέχνη,
we learned that once τέχνη was the name assigned to both hand-workly craft as well as the fine
arts, once it “was also the bringing-forth of the true in the beautiful (das Schöne).” 194 We traced
the staggering ways in which out of τέχνη arose technique, which somewhere along the masterful
way developed into modern technique— and up until now we have been tracing the perilous reign
of Ge-stell as modern technique’s Wesen. But what if we start with the peril, and work our way
back? What if we find that within the peril of Ge-stell as modern technique’s Wesen, we hear
τέχνη, and in τέχνη, as a bringing-forth of das Schöne, we hear ποίησις, and thus we hear the
ἀλήθεια of Being? It is one thing to pose this tracing as a ‘philosophical’ inquiry, but it is another
to actually correspond one’s thinking to this path from the peril into the save, insofar as the save
is the true unconcealment of Being. The poet is the one who corresponds their thinking with the
bringing-forth of das Schöne out of the concealment into unconcealment.
Before we get to this figure of the ‘poet,’ we need a better grasp of what is meant by
‘poetry’ within the framework of dwelling and saving. Poetry falls under the third category of
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ποίησις: the arts. In his essay “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger writes that all art is
essentially poetry “as long as we mean that those arts are varieties of the art of language, if it is
permissible to characterize poesy by that easily misinterpretable title.”195 If the essence of ‘art’ is
poetry, then the essence of particular forms of art such as “architecture, painting, sculpture, and
music,” is grounded in poesy.196 Broadly speaking, poesy west throughout many forms of artistic
creation as “one mode of the lighting projection of truth. i.e., of poetic composition in this wider
sense.” Poetic composition generally encompasses all modes of artistic production— from a
sculptural piece to symphonic work. But Heidegger argues that “the linguistic work, the poem in
the narrower sense, has a privileged position in the domain of the arts” because it is the most
directly akin to language.197 Thus, we draw the distinction here between the broader poesy and the
narrower poetic. The former as the Wesen of art and the poetic, and the latter as actual linguistic
composition.
The affinity between language and poetry is of the highest significance when shedding
light on either in their true Wesen. For “language itself is poetry in the essential sense,” and poetry
dwells within the realm of language. 198 In this dynamic relation, language and poetry nourish one
another. Poesy, as the Wesen of art and the poetic, “takes place in language because language
preserves the original nature of poetry.”199 We are told that poetry is the nature of art. But what is
this original nature of poetry that Heidegger speaks of? Heidegger’s answer to this question is that
“the nature of poetry… is the founding of truth.”200 The founding of truth as the nature of the poetic
holds up on the basis that poetry is always grounded in ποίησις as the brining-forth of ἀλήθεια.
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Heidegger refers to poetry, in its truth-founding nature, as an “illuminating projection.”201
The language of poetry as an “illuminating projection” echoes both die Lichtung and the
lightening-flash (das Blitzen) of the saving, and this resonance is no coincidence. The
corresponding language comes out of a shared characteristic between all of these luminous
happening, and it rests precisely in that they are luminous happenings. Truth in the sense of
ἀλήθεια shines-forth as das Schöne, truth is brought out of the darkness of the concealment and
into the glimmering light of unconcealment. Thus, when Heidegger says that poetry is an
‘illuminating projection,’ he is rejecting the conceptions that posit poetry merely as “an aimless
imagining of whimsicalities and… a flight of mere notions and fancies into the realm of the
unreal.”202 For Heidegger, poetry is something far different than mere expression in the form of
frivolous prose that is birthed solely out of an imagined world of fantasy. What poetry is, is the
unfoldment of the “unconcealedness of…the Open;” poetry, as the illuminating projection, lets the
unconcealing of the Open to happen, “and indeed in such a way that only now, in the midst of
beings, the Open brings beings to shine and ring out.”203
The illuminating projection of poetry is the disclosure of the Open, i.e., the unconcealment
of being. Poetry projects the human being into the Open of what Is— into Being—which is both
the peril and the saving. The poetic illumination clears the way of Being and lights die Lichtung;
thus, “truth, as the clearing and concealing of what is, happens in being composed, as a poet
composes a poem.”204 Who are these poets, who venture into the Open, composing poetry that
truth shines forth from? How does this truth shine forth? How does this poetry speak?
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For Heidegger the poet is an important figure, but only in that the poet listens attentively
to language in its true Wesen; “for, strictly, it is language that speaks. Man first speaks when, and
only when, he responds to language by listening to its appeal.”205 To be a poet and poeticize rests
entirely on the ability to listen and hear language’s appeal, which is the call of Being. More often
than not, the human being does not listen nor hear this appeal. In the unfolding of the peril as Gestell and homelessness, the human being does not listen to the call of Being. In part, because the
human forgets their role as the caring shepherd, ignores their Wesen as the one who ek-statically,
thoughtfully sustains the relationship between Being and language. Heidegger writes that “man
acts as though he is the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master
of him. When this relation of dominance gets inverted, man hits upon strange maneuvers.
Language becomes the means of expression.”206 In the destiny of Being’s forgottenness, the human
being neglects language in its true Wesen. But the poet, as the one who actually listens, hears the
ringing call of Being’s language out of the concealment, and responds to this call by way of poetic
composition. Therefore, “the responding in which man authentically listens to the appeal of
language is that which speaks in the element of poetry.”207
What comes along the disclosure of truth, ἀλήθεια, is freedom. If we recall from the
previous chapter, “all unconcealing comes out of the free (das Freie), goes into the free, and brings
into the free. The freedom of the free (das Freie) consists neither in the unboundness of the will to
choose (Willkür), nor in the binding of mere laws (Gesetze)…Freedom is the domain of the destiny
that at any time brings unconcealment on its way.”208 Das Freie is the open, it is the domain in
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which unconcealment west. The poet, in their nearness to das Freie is freer than the one who
remains bound to the will to mastery and thoughtlessly captivated under the spell of Ge-stell. In
the Open, the poet hears language more carefully in its true Wesen, and is thus liberated from the
linguistic ordering of Bestand. Heidegger writes:
The more poetic a poet is—the freer (that is, the more open and ready for the unforeseen)
his saying—the greater is the purity with which he submits what he says to an ever more
painstaking listening, and the further what he says is from the mere propositional statement
that is dealt with solely in regard to its correctness or incorrectness.209

What the poetic does is the clear the way for language to be free once again. The human being,
whose Wesen dwells in language, is also freed by this freeing. Heidegger tells us that das Freie
has nothing to do with free will nor in the kind of Kantian freedom that comes with aligning the
personal will to universal law. The will of the human being under the reign of Ge-stell is
somewhere in between the two. Within Ge-stell’s destining the human being assumes their will as
mastery in accordance with Ge-stell’s will of ordering; although the human may misunderstand
the carrying through of their masterful will as their free will, that is not entirely the case. But
paradoxically enough, even when the human being wills as master in the era of Ge-stell, the human
still remains free. This is because the human being belongs to Being’s destiny, even if that be a
perilous one. The human being may not be dignified as so ordered as Bestand, but there is a certain
kind of freedom that comes with the alignment of the will with Being’s destiny.
Nonetheless, the freedom of the poet is far greater than the freedom of the one who wills
mastery can ever be, precisely because the poet wills in accordance with the truth of Being. In
“What Are Poets For?” the modern human “is called the one who wills” and insofar as their

209

Martin Heidegger, “…Poetically Man Dwells…,” p. 214.

78
“willing remains mere self-assertion, they will nothing. They will nothing, in this sense, because
they are more willing.”210 The poet’s “willing wills nothing of this kind.”211 Heidegger turns to an
improvised poem of Rilke’s and, for lack of a better word, poeticizes about this poem. I don’t wish
to enter into this wildly dense analysis of the poem, nor the poem itself, in this paper. But I do
want to take note of a particular aspect Heidegger’s analysis that captures his own understanding
of the willing of the poet as something entirely other than the willing of the modern human.
Heidegger, as he does with many poems he finds to be ‘illuminating projections’ grabs hold of a
specific word and truly tries to listen to it. One of these words that resonates with Heidegger is the
word “venture.” I find “venture” to position itself as that which distinguishes the modern human
and their masterful willing from the poet and the poetic willing. My understanding is that the poet
is the one who ventures into the unconcealment of Being, and “because these more venturesome
ones,” namely poets, “venture Being itself and therefore dare to venture into language, the province
of Being, they are the sayers.”212
As the venturesome ones— the ones willing to enter the unknown and unconcealed, the
ones who listen to language in this nameless space— are able to bring-forth unconcealment. This
willing is radically distinct from than the sheer will to will that dominates the modern human being:
The more venturesome will more strongly in that they will in a different way from the purposeful
self-assertion of the objectifying of the world. …The willing of the more venturesome is the
willingness of those who say more sayingly, those who are resolved, no longer closed off in the
parting against the will as which Being wills beings.213
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The saying of the poet is a kind of singing for Heidegger, and it sings out of the Open and into the
world. Poetic saying opens up the clearingly concealed and invites those who too wish to listen in.
Thus, “the more venturesome are the poets, but poets whose song turns our unprotected being into
the Open.”214
In the epoch of the peril, the poets are those who open themselves up to Being’s
unconcealment. As attentive listeners, they hear the silence of Being ringing out of its stillness.
With open eyes they see the shining-forth of Being’s truth from out of the concealment. Poets
venture into the peril and bring with them the save, “as the singers of soundness, the more
venturesome ones are ‘poets in a destitute time.’”215
But the poetic, we must remember, does not fly above the world as something “otherworldy.” It very much belongs to this world, and the history of Being unfolded in the world of
beings, it speaks to the ways in which Being makes itself manifest to us beings. I am reminded of
Hannah Arendt’s portrayal of the activity of thinking in her text Between Past and Future, thinking
as “remembrance and anticipation” and “settling down in the gap between past and furture;” the
“path paved by thinking” is a “track of non-time.”216 I relate this to the thinking of the poet because
the poet’s thinking is not afraid to dwell in the peril, but it also shines-forth with the glimmer of
what can be. Poetic thinking belongs to the world, comes out of the world, yet also imagines the
possibility of new world making. Indeed, I stated that Being does not subscribe to the linear and
limited human scale that we try to impose onto it—but neither does poetic thinking. Poetic
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thinking, in its liminal state, carves the path of non-time, betwixt and between what has been, what
is, and what will be.
Poetic thinking is the kind of thinking that Heidegger describes in the final lines of his
“Letter on Humanism,” it is the “thinking gathers language into simple saying. In this way
language is the language of [Being], as clouds are the clouds of the sky. With its saying, thinking
lays inconspicuous furrows in language.” 217 , 218 The saying of poetic thinking paves an
inconspicuous path through language. But not just any path: a furrow. A furrow is a trail in which
seeds are planted, and these seeds may one day grow just as the growing of φύσις that brings-forth
das Schöne into the world.
As we are told the poet dwells on earth. But out of this earthly dwelling, the poet looks up
toward the clouds of the sky. From this upward glance, the poet:
Calls all the brightness of the sights of the sky and every sound of its courses and breezes
into the singing word and there makes them shine and ring. Yet the poet, if he is a poet,
does not describe the mere appearance of sky and earth. The poet calls, in the sights of the
sky, that which in its very self-disclosure causes the appearance of that which conceals
itself, and indeed as that which conceals itself. In the familiar appearances, the poet calls
the alien as that to which the invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it is—unknown.
219

Unlike the representation of beings in the peril (i.e., as Bestand and mere means to an end and
objects to be ordered) poetic thinking brings-forth beings in their true Wesen. Poetry not only
unconceals beings out of their concealment as semblances, but lets them ‘shine and ring.’ Insofar
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as language is reified within the homeless peril it becomes an appearance too. So too in the poetic
calling is language liberated from the trafficking of concealment.
Furthermore, by making visible the alien in the familiar, the unconcealing of poetry is das
Unheimliche (the uncanny). In Freud’s “The ‘Uncanny,’” he quotes Schelling, telling us that the
uncanny manifests in the act of an unconcealing: “‘unheimlich’ is the name for everything that
ought to have remained… secret and hidden but has come to light.”220 The uncanny happens when
what is unknown shines-forth, out of the familiar; when what is homely (heimlich) becomes
unhomely (unheimlich). The human being may find refuge from homelessness in the poetic save,
but their dwelling can be restored only after the “homely” — the familiarity of what is as it appears
within the peril— is unconcealed, made unhomely. Only then can our Wesen be freed, restored to
its proper dwelling place. Paul Celan’s words in “The Meridian” perfectly sum up this poetic,
uncanny movement that guides the human to freedom. Celan says: “Perhaps — I am only
speculating — perhaps poetry, like art, moves with the oblivious self into the uncanny and strange
to free itself.” Poetry moves with us, it carries us, into the uncanny, revealing to us what saves.
The poetic, in its ability to bring us back home to our essential dwelling, composes images
that are not just reiterations of the appearances we confront in the familiar world. These images
peer into the familiar but unveil the inconspicuous that is furrowed within the homely. Thus,
“poetic images are imaginings in a distinctive sense: not mere fancies and illusions but imaginings
that are visible inclusions of the alien in the sight of the familiar.”221 Poetic thinking ‘gathers
language into simple saying,’ and the “poetic saying of images gathers the brightness and sound
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of the heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and silence of what is alien.”222 Poetry
mediates the perilous split between ourselves and our Being because it reaches between the known
and unknown, into the secrets of the familiar, and makes these mysteries about ourselves, our
world, and our Being known to us. “When the poetic appropriately comes to light, then man dwells
humanly on this earth, and then—as Hölderlin says in his last poem— ‘the life of man’ is a
‘dwelling life.’” Poetry reconciles the alienation brought with the peril of homelessness and Gestell by restoring language and Being. Restored to its poetic Wesen, language calls to us out of the
peril of Being. Insofar as poetry is the saying of this call it is the saving of the peril, for its
disclosure opens up our dwelling place once again.223

Dwelling in the Saving
The question of dwelling is really a question of belonging. Where do we, as human beings,
belong? What do we belong to? We belong to Being but we dwell in our belonging on earth. In
destinal homelessness we lose our home on this earth, becoming alienated from both Being and
language. Poetry saves us from our homelessness and reminds us of what it means to belong:
“poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it. Poetry is
what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling.”224
Poetic creation is not an escape from the danger that is Being’s perilous unconcealment on this
earth. Poetry hears the call of Being’s unconcealment, confronts the peril, ventures into and, and
speaks out of it, addressing us. Those who hear the call, opening themselves up to listening, also
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open themselves up to dwelling in the save. The saving happens when we dwell in our proper
dwelling: the poetic. As Hölderlin first says and Heidegger says further, “full of merit, yet
poetically, man/ Dwells on this earth.”225
Heidegger dedicates a lecture to Hölderlin’s words that ‘man dwells poetically,’ and this
lecture eventually became an essay. In this lecture and essay, Heidegger is not merely conducting
an investigation into the phrase at hand, but is engaged in a rich and attentive dialogue. Naturally,
his inquiry remains situated within his own philosophical framework, densely related to the terms
and questions he finds thought-provoking. But it is no secret that many of Heidegger’s questions
are inspired by and drawn from his reading of Hölderlin’s works. In this particular case, he builds
upon the words of Hölderlin, expanding the meaning of the Hölderlin’s verse to meet his own
philosophy of language and alienation. In 1946 Heidegger wrote “The Letter on Humanism” in
which he explores the alienation of the modern human through what he calls homelessness. It is
homelessness because struck by alienation the human being loses their essential dwelling place,
their home, i.e., language. Five years later, in 1951, he lectures on the poetic dwelling of the human
being as what is essential to being human. There is a line that runs through the two, they speak
together. In the former we hear the problem, in the latter we hear the potential solution, but in both
we hear Hölderlin’s inspiration resound.
I am concluding with an exploration of Heidegger’s exploration of the poetic dwelling of
the human being, because I see it as the victory of the saving— the true causa finalis if you will.
But as the grand ‘finale’ it is both an end a beginning. As both a paradoxical end and beginning,
poetry stays true to its unmanageable nature, refusing the human dimensionality of space and time.
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Poetry can be here-ish and there-ish and now-ish and never-ish and we can still always belong to
it. I think poetry is the closest we have to a manifestation of Being in our world, it is the nearest
we can ever be to dwelling in Being. For this reason, it is a thoughtful pursuit that does not just
end on paper as nothing more than a philosophical musing, it continues to unfold in life, all around
us, as long as we humans exist as earthy dwellers.
Heidegger tells us that the phrase ‘poetically man dwells’ “speaks of man's dwelling. It
does not describe today's dwelling conditions. Above all, it does not assert that to dwell means to
occupy a house, a dwelling place. ” 226 The problem of ‘homelessness’ in the context of
Heidegger’s thinking is not applicable to say, Los Angeles’ Skid Row. No doubt the issue of
housing security that is rooted in deep structural failings is an incredibly important and, in my
opinion, a more pressing question. But it is also a different question than the one we are asking
here. ‘Dwelling’ in this line of thought does not signify apartment we return do at the end of the
workday, or the house we do or do not have over our head. To dwell is to be human for Heidegger,
and poetic dwelling is the highest of all dwelling.
The move from ‘dwelling’ as signifying an abode to ‘dwelling’ meaning the way in which
the human west as the human is a poetic move. Poetry liberates language, freeing it from the
ordering of grammar, shallow eloquence, and daily speech that meets mere utilitarian ends. In the
poetic space, words break out of the small boxes they are placed into, meanings delimited by. The
word “dwelling” can be a physical home in the poetic, but it can also be the essential dwelling of
the human being. Heidegger says that when “Hölderlin speaks of dwelling, he has before his eyes
the basic character of human existence,” and Heidegger does too. Both thinkers “[see] the ‘poetic,’
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moreover, by way of its relation to this dwelling, thus understood essentially.”227 Dwelling posited
as the primordial condition of human life is essentially grounded in poetry precisely because poetry
is what lets dwelling be this dwelling; “in such a way… dwelling rests on the poetic.”228
Because of the way in which poetry frees language, “the phrase, ‘poetically man dwells’
says: poetry first causes dwelling to be dwelling.”229 And because of the way in which poetry frees
us, “poetry is what really lets us dwell.”230 Poetry not only frees us and language, enabling us to
once again dwell in language, poetry builds our dwelling: “poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is
a kind of building.”231 Heidegger writes:
Thus we confront a double demand: for one thing, we are to think of what is called man's
existence by way of the nature of dwelling; for another, we are to think of the nature of
poetry as a letting-dwell, as a—perhaps even the—distinctive kind of building. If we search
out the nature of poetry according to this viewpoint, then we arrive at the nature of
dwelling.232

The twofold inquiry is in many ways one demand, insofar as the human being’s existence is
dwelling and the poetic is precisely what builds this particular kind of human dwelling. Building
is essential to the question of the poetic as human dwelling, thereby it is Heidegger’s idea of
‘building’ that we shall now take up. Heidegger’s introduction of ‘building’ into the poetic
dwelling of the human being is not something that Hölderlin does: “for Hölderlin indeed speaks
of man's dwelling and his merit, but still he does not connect dwelling with building, as we have
just done… Accordingly, Hölderlin does not speak of poetic dwelling as our own thinking does.
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Despite all this, we are thinking the same thing that Hölderlin is saying poetically.”233 As earlier
addressed, Heidegger intently listens to Hölderlin’s words and responds in accordance to his own
thinking, which he calls ‘our thinking.’ Heidegger’s introduction of the notion of building
expounds upon Hölderlin’s idea of the human’s poetic dwelling. It’s a move that thinks out of
language, a kind of poetic building in its own right. So, what is this ‘building’ exactly? And why
is it so important to human dwelling?
In Heidegger’s essay “Building Dwelling Thinking,” he asks a similar question: What
“does Bauen, building, mean?”234 It comes as no surprise that to answer this question he embarks
on an etymological inquiry. His quest tells us that to build primordially means to dwell: “the Old
English and High German word for building, buan, means to dwell. This signifies: to remain, to
stay in a place. The real meaning of the verb bauen, namely, to dwell, has been lost to us.”235
Dwelling is the way the human being west in the world, but building (Bauen) in its original
meaning is a kind of dwelling. Building is thus a way of Being in the world:
Bauen originally means to dwell… The old word bauen, to which the bin belongs, answers:
ich bin, du bist mean: I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner
in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be
on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell.236

To be as you are (du bist) is to dwell, it is to build. Heidegger’s thinking digs up and resurrects
and resurrects bauen in its original sense of the word, the meaning “which says that man is insofar
as he dwells.”237
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Heidegger’s thinking about building goes even further back than Old English and High
German. Although not explicitly linked, Heidegger’s conception of building as the poetic dwelling
of the human being is obviously rooted in ποίησις (poiesis). As a careful bringing-forth in the form
of either Φύσις (physis: nature), hand-workly making, or the arts, ποίησις is a kind of building. In
Heidegger’s following words on bauen, we hear the bringing-forth of Φύσις shine: “bauen
however also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically
to till the soil, to cultivate the vine. Such building only takes care—it tends the growth that ripens
into its fruit of its own accord. Building in the sense of preserving and nurturing is not making
anything.”238 But building is not limited to the bringing-forth of caring for nature and nurturing
the earth. Building also may be understood as works that are constructed, Heidegger writes that
“shipbuilding and temple-building, on the other hand, do in a certain way make their own works.
Here building, in contrast with cultivating, is a constructing.”239 He explicitly posits building on
the basis of Latin etymology, saying that “Latin colere, cultura, and building as the raising up of
edifices, aedificare—are comprised within genuine building, that is, dwelling.”240 Yet it is not hard
to hear prominence of ποίησις in Heidegger’s positing of building as the cultivating of nature and
constructing edifice. Building in this way is the bringing-forth of ποίησις.
We seem to have found ourselves in a complicated web of terms and relations to say the
least. Dwelling is poetic, but dwelling is also somehow building, and building is cultivating and
caring, which also is a kind of bringing forth of ποίησις. It has all become slightly confusing in its
entanglement, but Heidegger succinctly distills it all into a clarifying three-point summary. He
says that “if we listen to what language says in the word bauen we hear three things,” namely: “1.
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building is really dwelling,” “2. dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth,” and “3.
building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and the building that
erects buildings.”241 But it is important to note that for Heidegger the building that dwelling unfold
in is not just any kind aedificare. In a prior example, he cites the cultivating-building of dwelling
in its Wesen (i.e., ‘the manner in which mortals are on the earth’) as ‘shipbuilding’ and ‘templebuilding.’ These examples may seem a bit far-out and random. When I first read it, I myself thought
“shipbuilding? really?” However, in this instance there is a method to Heidegger’s madness, for
he is pushing back against kinds of building that further the ends of Ge-stell, Bestand, and the
masterful will:
Not every building is a dwelling. Bridges and hangars, stadiums and power stations are
buildings but not dwellings; railway stations and highways, dams and market halls are built,
but they are not dwelling places…These buildings house man. He inhabits them and yet
does not dwell in them, when to dwell means merely that we take shelter in them.242

Although in the final line Heidegger says that the difference lies in physical sheltering versus
essential dwelling, there is definitely another distinction at play. The building and buildings that
Heidegger mentions are that of modern technique. He does not mention the humbly built abode of
the peasant nor the weathervane atop this home. He fails to mention the sawmills of the Black
Forest nor the carved footpath that hypothetically leads to said sawmill. This is intentional, because
for Heidegger these are the manifestations of technique in alignment with ποίησις. Therefore,
Heidegger is distinguishing here between the building that unfolds within the peril versus the save.
This difference—between the building that unfolds under the will to master and the
building that unfolds in the poetic willing— insists that building is not reduced down to a means
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to an end; for such reduction would be a continuation of Ge-stell’s ordering. Although “we attain
to dwelling, so it seems, only by means of building,”243 “building is not merely a means and a way
toward dwelling—to build is in itself already to dwell.”244 Poetic building is an end itself because
it is dwelling: to build is to dwell. Hence, poetic building is not an ordering of Bestand, it is a
“letting dwell,” a caring cultivation.
Heidegger heeds that “only if we are capable of dwelling jf, only then can we build”245 As
human beings, our Wesen dwells in the house of Being, in language. Insofar as poetry lets language
shine-forth in its truest sense, as the language of Being, it the highest form of language. We belong
to the bringing-forth of Being’s unconcealment, thus we belong to ποίησις. The poetic, as a way
in which truth is brought-forth, is a certain kind of unconcealment—it is the unconcealment of
Being and language in their true Wesen. The human being hears the poetic call of Being and
language in thinking, and insofar as the human being carefully listens and answers, they are a
poet—they build poetically. In this poetic building (caring, cultivating, thinking) the human being
dwells in their true Wesen, the human being dwells poetically. We are all capable of this essential
dwelling and building, but in the perilous destiny Ge-stell and homelessness, we are driven out of
home and into alienation. Poetry reaches into the alienated peril and calls to us, invites us to dwell
in language once again and reconcile our relationship with Being. But all of this depends upon one
thing: that we learn to listen and hear the call.
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It begins where it ends,
I descend into black earth,
dark primordial slime,
no longer repellent to me,
no confining
The four winds
Fire welds splinter with splinter
I find my kindred spirits
— Gloria Anzaldúa
“Canción de la diosa de la noche”

Poetry is the way we help give name to the nameless so it can
be thought. The farthest external horizons of our hopes and
fears are cobbled by our poems, carved from the rock
experiences of our daily lives.
— Audre Lorde
“Poetry is Not a Luxury”

If we want thought different from the present, then thought must veer
toward art.
To be a thing at all—a rock, a lizard, a human— is to be in a twist.
How thought longs to twist and turn like the serpent poetry!
Or is art veering toward thought? Does it ever arrive?
The threads of fate have tied our tongues.
Tongue twisters inclined towards nonsense.
Logic includes nonsense as long as it can tell the truth.
— Timothy Morton,
“Beginning After the End”
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Conclusion

Human existence always wavers between estrangement and becoming. To posit oneself as
“human” inherently estranges the “other:” the inhuman. The “other” is comprised of nonhuman
beings, which includes actual human beings, insofar as there are communities of people in this
world treated as if they were non-people. But this inhuman “other” also includes Being itself. And
our understanding of the self as “human” necessitates this exclusion. If you remove the other, the
concept of the “human” dissolves. It is only out of this exclusion we become “human.” We need
this exclusion to set ourselves over and above all else. And to be the dominant one is so often what
defines the human within the discourse of where we refer to as the “West.” But within such policed
boundaries of humanness we cut ourselves off from “belonging” to, within, and alongside the
inhuman. These hard-drawn boundaries, between the human and the inhuman, alienate the human
being from its actual essence: belonging to Being. This is because Being, what I understand to be
the immanent ebb-and-flow of existence, is constantly posited as outside human existence;
something inhumane, outside of our world. The boundaries are ways of ordering of the world and
controlling existence— a kind of Ge-stell and Bestand. These boundaries, that enable us to become
“human,” alienate actual human existence from other human and nonhuman beings, the world,
Being, and ourselves. We are born into an alienated world, and expected to subscribe to normalized
estrangement of Being insofar as we are “human beings.” But there always remains possibility of
new-world making. Poetry holds open the potential of insurgent reclamation of what it means to
be human in this world.
The claim that we are born into the world already alienated from our Being is my own
claim. I don’t have the knowledge to speak on whether or not Heidegger would agree with that
statement. But I do think that Heidegger would agree that we are born into a world that is ridden
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with alienation; and because we belong to the world, we belong to this way of estrangement as
well. This sentiment on alienation has been a main premise of this project. In “Homeless” I looked
at one way of alienation: one that manifests from linguistic degradation, the loss of thinking in the
mundane world, the decay of thought in philosophy, and the will to mastery that has taken hold.
This kind of alienation denies the human their dwelling in language—their essential dwelling in
the world. Being and language withdraw from the world, and the human is left homeless.
“Imperiled” peers into a different kind of alienation, one that encompasses homelessness, but
builds upon it. At its core, the peril is the unhinged manifestation of the will to will in the world—
namely, Ge-stell. Under Ge-stell’s reign, the human being loses not only their dwelling place but
their also their stand. Along with all other beings, the human being becomes mere Be-stand.
The peril materializes in its highest form out of the rise modern technique. Simply put, the
peril is the result of our need to know, control, and order the world. Indeed, the peril is a way that
Being unconceals itself. But what this really tells us is that this perilous way of Being is far greater
than the actions or thoughts of a single individual could ever affect. Being unconcealment is
everywhere and nowhere, it is impossible to pin down. If we understand the peril—that is to say
rampant alienation— as a structural issue in the world, as I do, then we need far more than a
singular person to take the red pill. The problem of alienation, which is implicitly bound to the
ravenous will and decline of language/thinking, can only be addressed through language and
thinking. But not just the repetition of the same language and thinking that caused the problem in
the first place.
The language of the saving is poetic language— it is language in its fullest essence and
expansive reach. Poetic language is necessarily informed by the experience and struggle of beingin-the-world. In the words of Lorde: poetry is “carved from the rock and experience of our daily
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lives.”246 The poet actually thinks about estrangement and the loss of language and meaning in the
world. But from this peril of Being, the poet responds thoughtfully, full of meaning, and in
language. I say that this response is insurrectionary because it emerges from out of the struggle of
becoming: poetry unconceals itself precisely in the tension between estrangement and becoming.
I don’t want to say that poetry ‘mediates’ or ‘resolves’ this tension, because I don’t think that such
disintegration is the “end” of poetry. Poetry is an end only insofar as it is a beginning. It does not
think away the problem, it thinks with the problem, it thinks in the problem. And only from out of
the problem can it bring-forth the possibility of a new kind of world-building.
I chose to explore the question of alienation through Heidegger’s writing because I find
that it offers profound insight on the manifestation of modern alienation in the world. But more
importantly, how we may begin to think our way out of it. His articulation of homelessness and
technique puts into words the deeply breathed estrangement that has seeped into the air of this
world. By way of his concept of “dwelling” he illuminates what it means to belong, or not belong,
in a new light. His thinking also challenges the reader’s own thinking. The way he builds with
language invites the reader into the words, to listen more attentively. I find this not only inspiring
but also constructive. Heidegger’s perspective on poetry is where I find myself most in agreement
with him as a thinker. Yet the position that poetics is a kind of “saving” so to speak, is also where
I find the most freedom in this essay to deviate away from the ‘Heideggerian’ line of thought. I
suppose poetics lends itself to this kind of freedom, and that’s precisely why the saving lies in
poiesis.
For good reason, poetry has always been a way of living and a survival tactic and survival
tactic for marginalized peoples. Poetry can allow for all humans to heal with the material wounds
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caused by the estranged reality of living in the world. But for those pushed to the furthest margins
of the world, excluded from the category of “human,” subjected to the full force of a masterful
will, denied their dwelling place and home, and left with no place of belonging, poetry is essential.
Poetry opens up a true space of belonging; one not fraught with the ego of the master or the
oppression of the world. It is born out of this oppression, but from this birth comes a new world.
And in this world, the human may begin mend the caesuras caused by estrangement and violent
becomings. In the poetic space, the human being is returned to their dwelling place that they truly
belong to. Poetry allows the human to become again, basking in the clearing of Being, a magical
light that heals the wounds of embodiment.
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